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L Introduction
Since the 1970s, the criminal justice system has become increasingly
responsive to the needs of crime victims and their families.1 As a result of this
increased responsiveness, victim impact evidence2 has become a prevalent
feature in criminal trials, particularly in capital sentencing proceedings.3 In
1991, the Supreme Court held in Payne v. Tennessee4 that the Eighth Amend-
ment5 does not prohibit individual states from choosing to allowthe admission
of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of capital trials.6 Having
eliminated the previously existing constitutional bar against victim impact
evidence, the Court noted in passing that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment7 was the proper source for relief in cases in which the
1. See, e.g., Andrew J. Karmen, Who's Against Victims' Rights? The Nature of the
Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 157,
158-60 (1992) (discussing inception and evolution ofvictims' rights movement); Ashley Paige
Dugger, Note, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History oflncompatibility, 23
AM. J. CRIM. L. 375,377-81 (1996) (same); Alice Koskela, Comment, Victim's RightsAmend-
ments: An Irresistible Political Force Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L.
REV. 157, 158-60 (1997) (discussing evolution and current political power of "victim's rights
movement").
2. See infra Part II (discussing nature of victim impact evidence).
3. See Koskela, supra note 1, at 167 (noting prevalence of state constitutional victim's
rights amendments regarding presentation of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing).
4. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
6. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that "if the State chooses
to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject,
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar"). In Payne, the Supreme Court reconsidered its
prior position that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from using victim impact evidence
in the sentencing phase of capital trials. Id. at 811. A jury convicted Pervis Payne on two
counts of first degree murder and sentenced him to death for each murder. Id. The charges
stemmed from an attack that left Charisse Christopher and her two-year-old daughter Lacie dead
from multiple stab wounds inflicted with a butcher knife. Id. at 812-13. Christopher's three-
year-old son Nicholas sustained several stab wounds in the attack, but he ultimately survived.
Id. at 812. At the sentencing phase of Payne's trial, the prosecution called Charisse Christo-
pher's mother to the witness stand and elicited testimony from her about how the murders had
affected Nicholas. Id. at 814-15. In addition, while arguing for the death penalty, the prosecu-
tor made statements about the impact of the murders on Nicholas and on Charisse's parents.
Id. at 815-16. Payne argued that the use of victim impact evidence and argument violated his
rights under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 816. The Court reasoned that victim impact
evidence served the legitimate purpose of informing the capital sentencing jury about the
specific harm caused by the defendant. Id. at 825. Accordingly, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit states from choosing to admit victim impact evidence. Id. at 827.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("IN]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... ."). The Eighth Amendment applies to the states
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victim impact evidence was unduly prejudicial! The Payne decision, an
important victory for victims' rights advocates and an unequivocal rejection
of two modem Supreme Court decisions, has been the subject of extensive
commentary.9
In the years since Payne, nearly all the death penalty states'0 have
chosen to permit the admission of victim impact evidence. 1 In addition, the
United States Congress has provided for the admission of victim impact
evidence in federal capital trials. 2 No less than seventeen death penalty states
have incorporated into their state constitutions a statement of victims' rights
that includes a qualified or unqualified right to offer victim impact evidence
before sentencing.' 3 Numerous states have provided for the admission of
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
8. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (noting that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amend-
ment is available to defendants when victim impact evidence encroaches upon fundamental
fairness of trial).
9. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Bartolo, Comment, Payne v. Tennessee: The Future Role of
Victim Statements of Opinion in Capital SentencingProceedings, 77 IOWAL. REV. 1217, 1224-
39 (1992) (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Payne); Craig Edward Gilmore, Note, Payne
v. Tennessee: Rejection of Precedent, Recognition of Victim Impact Worth, 41 CATH. U. L.
REV. 469, 502-04 (1992) (discussing stare decisis implications of Payne); Jonathan H. Levy,
Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1027, 1038-50 (1993) (discussing potential limitations on use of victim impact evidence
afterPayne); CatherineBendor, RecentDevelopment, Defendants' Wrongs and Victims 'Rights:
Payne v. Tennessee, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 219, 231-43 (1992) (analyzing Payne and
discussing its potential implications).
10. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 66-82 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 2d ed. 1997)
(noting that Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming currently authorize death penalty
for murder).
11. The manner by which states allow the admission of victim impact evidence-whether
by constitutional provision, by statute, or by judicial decision - is not material to the analysis
of the evidence itself. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 821 (noting that Tennessee did not, at time of
trial, provide for victim impact evidence by statute, but such evidence had same "purpose and
effect" as if statute had provided for it).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994) (providingthatvictim impactis factorthatmayjustify
death penalty against defendant).
13. See ALA. CONST. amend. 557 (establishing rights ofcrime victims including right"to
be heard when authorized"); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (establishing rights of crime victims
including right "to be heard at any proceeding involving.., sentencing"); COLO. CONST. arL II,
§ 16a (establishing rights of crime victims including right "to be heard when relevant"); FLA.
CoNsT. art. I, § 16(b) (same); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (establishing rights of crime victims
including right "[tio be heard, upon request, at... sentencing,.., unless manifest injustice
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victim impact evidence by statutes which provide explicitly that the sentenc-
ing authority may or even must consider victim impact evidence in making
capital sentencing determinations. 14 The sentencing provisions of the remain-
ing death penalty states allow for the admission of any evidence that is gener-
ally relevant to sentencing" or to the aggravating or mitigating factors at
would result"); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (establishing rights of crime victims including "right to
make a statement to the court at sentencing"); KAN. CONsT. art. 15, § 15 (establishing rights of
crime victims including right "to be heard at sentencing"); MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 47 (estab-
lishing rights of crime victims including right, "upon request and if practicable,... to be heard
at a criminaljustice proceeding"); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (establishing rights of crime victims
including "right to make a statement to the court at sentencing"); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32
(establishing right of crime victims including right to be "heard at... sentencings"); NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing rights of crime victims including right to be "[h]eard at all
proceedings for.., sentencing"); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (establishing rights of crime victims
including "right to make a statement to the court at sentencing"); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37
(establishing rights of crime victims including "right to be heard at sentencing of the accused in
a manner prescribed by law"); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (establishing rights of crime victims
including right "to be heard at any sentencing"); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (establishing rights of
crime victims including right to "be heard at... sentencing"); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28 (estab-
lishing rights of crime victims including, upon request, right "to be heard at important criminal
justice hearings"); VA. CONsT. art. I, § 8-A (establishing rights of crime victims and noting that
"[t]hese rights may include... rightto address the circuit court atthe time sentence is imposed").
14. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (Michie 1997) (allowing victim impact evidence at
sentencing if defendant has rebuttal opportunity); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West
1998) (allowing victim impact evidence ifjudge deems evidence to have probative value and
if defendanthas opportunityto react); FLA. STAT.ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1999) (allowing
victim impact evidence once prosecution has presented evidence as to one or more aggravator);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (1997) (allowing victim impact testimony, subject to cross-
examination, at discretion oftrialjudge); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306 (Supp. 1998) (allowing victim
impact statement and testimony, upon request, at capital sentencing hearing); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West 1997) (providing that capital sentencing hearing shall focus on
impact of murder on victim's family members); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609 (Supp. 1998)
(allowing sentencing body to consider victim impact statement prior to sentencing); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 1998) (allowing evidence "concerning the murder victim and the
impact of the crime upon the family of the victims and others"); MONT. CODEANN. § 46-18-302
(1997) (allowing admission of evidence of harm that murder caused to victim and victim's
family); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 1998) (allowing state to present victim impact
evidence if defendant presents evidence of defendant's character or prior record); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 1999) (allowing victim impact evidence); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150 (1997) (same); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 1998) (same); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-2 (Michie 1998) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-202 (1997) (requiring
sentencing judge to "solicit and consider" victim impact statement); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-3-
207 (Supp. 1998) (allowing evidence concerning murder's impact on victim's family and
community); VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie Supp. 1998) (requiring admission of victim
impact evidence at sentencing); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-21-103 (Michie 1997) (allowing victim
impact evidence).
15. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994) (allowing evidence on any matter relevant to
sentence); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a
(West Supp. 1998) (same); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1998) (same); KAN. STAT.
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issue.'6 In a majority of these remaining states, the courts have ruled in favor
of admitting victim impact evidence.' 7
Part II of this Note describes victim impact evidence.18 Part III briefly
discussesthe Supreme Court's decision inPaynev. Tennessee.'9 PartIV exam-
ines the current status of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of
capital murdertrialsunderfederal laws20 and the laws of Texas2' and Virginia,'
the two leading death penalty states.' Against the aggravating circumstances
ANN. § 21-4624(c) (1995) (same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1994) (same); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2521 (1995) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1997) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000 (Supp. 1997) (same); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art 37.071 (West Supp. 1997)
(same); VA.CODEANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1995) (same); WASH.REV.CODEANN. § 10.95.060
(West 1990) (same).
16. See ARIZ7REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 1998) (allowing evidence relevant
to aggravating or mitigating factors); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Supp. 1998) (same); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West Supp. 1998) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Michie
1998) (same); KY. REV. STAT.ANN. § 532.025 (Michie Supp. 1996) (allowing evidence relevant
in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of sentence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:3 (1996)
(allowing evidence relevant to aggravating or mitigating factors); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1
(Michie 1994) (allowing evidence relevant to aggravating or mitigating factors or to circum-
stances of crime); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (allowing evidence
relevant to aggravating or mitigating factors); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2929.03 (Banks-Baldwin
1997) (same); S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-20 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) (allowing evidence relevant
to extenuating, mitigating, or aggravating factors).
17. See Exparte Slaton, 680 So. 2d 909, 928 (Ala. 1996) (stating that Alabama permits
victim impactevidence and argument at capital sentencing), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 742 (1997);
People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436,465 (Cal. 1991) (allowing victim impact evidence at capital
sentencing); In re State, 597 A.2d 1, 3 (Del. 1991) (same); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942
S.W.2d 293,303 (Ky.) (same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 451 (1997); Jenkinsv. State, 607 So. 2d
1171, 1183 (Miss. 1992) (same); Homickv. State, 825 P.2d 600, 606 (Nev. 1992) (same); State
v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 205 (N.C. 1994) (same); State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878,
882 (Ohio 1995) (same); State v. Byram, 485 S.E.2d 360, 366 (S.C. 1997) (same); State v.
Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990) (same), aff'd, 501 U.S. 808(1991); Statev. Gentry, 888
P.2d 1105, 1134 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (same). ButseeBivinsv. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957
(Ind. 1994) (stating thatvictim impact evidence is admissible under Constitution oflndiana only
if relevant to statutory aggravator at issue in trial, and that victim impact evidence was not
relevant to aggravator of murder in commission of robbery).
The highest courts of Connecticut, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and New York, states
without statutory or constitutional provisions for victim impact evidence, have not ruled on the
admissibility of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings.
18. See infra Part II (discussing nature of victim impact evidence).
19. 501 U.S. 808 (1991); see infra Part III (discussing Supreme Court's decision in
Payne).
20. See infra Part IV.A (discussing federal death penalty law and victim impact evidence).
21. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Texas death penalty law and victim impact evidence).
22. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Virginia death penalty law and victim impact evi-
dence).
23. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State Since 1976
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that each of those jurisdictions recognizes as tending to warrant the death
penalty, Part IV argues that victim impact evidence should be inadmissible in
the three jurisdictions.24 Specifically, under federal law, the probative value
of victim impact evidence is insufficient to overcome its prejudicial effect. '
Likewise, victim impact evidence is not relevant to the sentencing decision
under the laws of Texas and Virginia.26 Part V evaluates the due process
standard that applies to victim impact evidence under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 7 In light of this case-specific standard and the corresponding eviden-
tiary problems that victim impact evidence presents, this Note concludes that
legislatures and courts should reevaluate their decisions to admit victim
impact evidence.28
II. Victim Impact Evidence
In the context of capital sentencing, the "victim impact" concept encom-
passes several discrete matters. 9 The term "victim impact evidence" refers
to evidence having a tendency to show the personal characteristics of the
murder victim and the effect that the victim's death has had on the surviving
family members and friends." Courts often receive victim impact evidence
as testimony from the victim's survivors." The evidence also may come in
the form of written victim impact statements prepared by the survivors them-
(visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicreg.html> (stating that Texas is first
in executions since 1976 with 166 and Virginia is second with 60).
24. See infra Part IV (discussing federal, Texas, and Virginia death penalty laws and
victim impact evidence).
25. See infraPartIV.A.2 (concluding thatvictim impact evidence should be inadmissible
at federal capital sentencing hearing).
26. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C (concluding that victim impact evidence is not relevant
to capital sentencing in Texas or Virginia).
27. See infra Part V (discussing due process standard applicable to victim impact
evidence).
28. See infra Part VI (concluding that courts and legislatures should reevaluate their
decisions to allow admission of victim impact evidence).
29. See infra Part II (discussing nature of victim impact evidence).
30. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (noting that victim impact evi-
dence at issue in case described emotional impact of murder on families of victims, as well as
personal characteristics of actual victims), overruled in part by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991).
31. See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting testimony regarding effect that murders
had on three-year-old who survived attack that killed his mother and younger sister); Rippo v.
State, 946 P.2d 1017, 1031 (Nev. 1997) (noting testimony of five witnesses addressing how
victims' deaths had affected witnesses' lives), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 104 (1998); Weeks v.
Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379,389 (Va. 1994) (noting testimony ofvictim's widow regarding
effect of murder on victim's family).
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selves or by an officer of the court.32 Whether oral or written, victim impact
evidence often is an intensely emotional expression of the survivors' grief.33
Additionally, prosecutors frequently invoke victim impact in their
sentencing phase argument before the jury or judge in capital cases in an
attempt to secure the death penalty against convicted capital defendants.34 In
terms of its constitutional analysis, the United States Supreme Court has
effectively collapsed the various forms of victim impact evidence and argu-
ment.35 This Note likewise makes no analytical distinction between types of
32. See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 509-15 (reproducing full text of victim impact statement
as appendix to majority opinion); In re Rieber, 663 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala. 1995) (noting trial
court's receipt of written victim impact statement in presentence investigation report); State v.
Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Idaho 1991) (noting that investigator interviewed victim's family
and prepared written victim impact statement for court's consideration at sentencing).
33. See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting testimony from grandmother of
three-year-old survivor of attack that left his mother and sister dead: "He cries for his mom.
He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister
Lacie. He ... asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm
worried about my Lacie."); Booth, 482 U.S. at 511 (quoting victim impact statement: "The
[victims' granddaughter] was to be married two days later.... She had been lookingforward
to [the wedding] eagerly, but it was a sad occasion with people crying.... The next day,
instead of going on her honeymoon, she attended her grandparents' funerals."), overruled in
part by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593, 673 (Ariz.
1992) (en banc) (quoting poem submitted to trial court by murder victim's sister: "Growing up
with you was the best thing for me. You taught me to be myself and the best that I could be.
... But all those days are gone now they're just a memory, of me and my little sis together
faithfully."); Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 919 n.6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting
statement of murder victim's mother regarding impact on victim's sons: "We've had to answer
questions like, 'why is daddy dead? Why did the mean men hurt daddy? Will daddy come back
and take us on a vacation when our piggy bank is full?'"); McDuffv. State, 939 S.W.2d 607,
619-20 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (noting testimony from victim's sister that, as result of
murder, sister was afraid to go out alone at night, experienced marital difficulties, and missed
victim's "acceptance and love"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 125 (1997); Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d
107, 112-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (noting tearful testimony of victim's mother that
because of her daughter's murder, "she felt like she was embalmed and had a dead body and felt
like she cried inside all the time, and knew that there is no end to her mourning for her son nor
her grief').
34. See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 815-16 (quoting prosecutor's argumentregarding effect
of murders on surviving family members); Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600, 605 (Nev. 1992)
(noting prosecutor's argument regarding impact of victims' death on surviving family mem-
bers); State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 204 (N.C. 1994) (noting prosecutor's statement that
"[t]here are children in this world today that are without mothers because of [defendant]"
(alterations in original)).
35. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (holding that states may choose to permit victim impact
evidence and argument). The specific victim impact evidence and argument at issue in Payne
addressed the effect of the murders on the surviving family members. Id. at 814-16. In
addition, Payne specifically allows evidence and argumentregarding the personal characteristics
of the victim. Id at 827.
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victim impact evidence or argument, although it will discuss distinctions when
necessary for an accurate reflection of either the facts or the decision in a
particular case.
III. The Supreme Court Removes the Bar
In holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the admission
of victim impact evidence, the Court in Payne v. Tennessee overruled two of
its decisions from the late 1980s' 6 In Booth v. Maryland,37 a 1987 decision,
the Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the sentencing-
phase admission of evidence regarding amurder victim's personal characteris-
tics or the impact of the murder on the victim's family." The Booth Court
found that victim impact evidence was irrelevant to the sentencing decision
and that it had the potential to influence the jury improperly. 9 Two years
The victim impact evidence that the Supreme Court had previously barred under the
Eighth Amendment included the survivors' characterizations of the murders and the survivors'
opinions regarding the appropriate punishment for the crimes. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09.
Payne did not involve victim impact evidence of this kind. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. Thus,
the holding of Payne does not overrule this aspect of Booth. Id. This Note does not address
survivors' characterizations of the crime or their opinions about the appropriate sentence.
36. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991) (overruling South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). The Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari in Payne included a specific request for briefing and argument on
whether the Court should overrule the two cases. Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076, 1076
(mem. granting cert.), amended by 498 U.S. 1080 (1991). Neither Payne nor the State of
Tennessee had initially argued for the overruling of Gathers orBooth. Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that Court's request that parties address overruling Gathers and Booth was "a
question presented neither in the petition for certiorari nor in the response").
37. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
38. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501-03 (1987) (holding that "Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence"), overruled
in part by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). A jury found the petitioner in Booth
guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. Id. at 498. Pursuant to statute, the state prepared
a victim impact statement (VIS) that included family members' comments about the character
of the victims and the effect of the crimes on the victims' surviving family. Id. at 498-500. The
trial court denied the petitioner's motion to suppress the VIS. Id at 500-01. After considering
the VIS, the jury sentenced the petitioner to death on one of the murder counts. Id. at 50 1. The
Supreme Court, however, found that the information contained in the VIS was irrelevant to the
jury's proper sentencing considerations. Id. at 507. Because the VIS also threatened the jury's
"reasoned decisionmaking," the Court held that the introduction ofa VIS at capital sentencing
violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 508-09.
The Booth Court found thatthe Eighth Amendment barred testimony regarding the family
members' "opinions and characterizations of the crimes." Id. at 508. The Payne Court
explicitly did not overrule this aspect of Booth. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2.
39. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03 (finding that victim impact evidence was irrelevant to
capital sentencing decision and presented risk of improperly diverting jury's attention).
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later, the Court in South Carolina v. Gathers" extended the rule of Booth to
prohibit prosecutorial argument on a homicide victim's personal characteris-
tics.
4'
With the Payne decision, however, the Court explicitly overruled both
of these earlier cases.42 In Payne, a Tennessee jury had convicted Pervis
Tyrone Payne for the murders of a woman and her two-year-old daughter.43
At the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented testimony and argument
regarding the effect of the murders on the victims' family.' The jury sen-
tenced Payne to death on both murder counts.45 On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, Payne argued that the victim impact testimony and
argument presented at sentencing violated his rights under the Eighth Amend-
ment.46 Although Tennessee's high court characterized the victim impact
testimony as "technically irrelevant," the court rejected Payne's argument and
affirmed the sentence.47
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and requested that
the parties address the possible reconsideration of Booth and Gathers.48
Neither Payne nor the State of Tennessee had sought reconsideration of the
prior cases.49 Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to affirm the Supreme Court
of Tennessee and to reject the two precedents.5" In support of its new posi-
tion, the Payne Court stated that victim impact evidence was relevant to
40. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
41. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1989) (extending Booth rule to
prosecutorial argument involving characterization of victim's personal qualities), overruled by
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808(1991). In Gathers, ajury convicted the defendant of murder
and sentenced him to death. Id at 806. At the sentencing phase, the prosecutor commented
extensively on the victim's character traits and religious beliefs. Id. at 808-10. Finding no
distinction between the descriptions of the victim's character made by the prosecutor and the
statements made by the victims' families in Booth, the Court upheld the South Carolina
Supreme Court's reversal of Gathers's death sentence. Id. at 810-11.
42. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 (overruling Booth and Gathers regarding victim impact
evidence and argument).
43. See id. at 811 (noting factual and procedural background of case).
44. See id. at 814-16 (discussing prosecution's evidence and argument at sentencing
phase).
45. See id. at 816 (noting sentence).
46. See id. (noting Payne's arguments on appeal to Supreme Court of Tennessee).
47. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990) (finding that victim impact
testimony, though "technically irrelevant," was not unconstitutional), aff'd, 501 U.S. 808
(1991).
48. See Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076, 1076 (1991) (granting certiorari).
49. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that neither petition for certiorari nor response
to petition for certiorari presented question of overruling Booth or Gathers).
50. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 (overruling Booth and Gathers).
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demonstrate the full scope of the harm caused by a murder."1 Central to this
claim is the concept that the indirect effects of a murder, such as the grief of
the victim's family, are included in the "specific harm" that the homicidal act
causes.52 Given this characterization, six Justices joined the Court's opinion
holding that victim impact evidence served legitimate purposes at capital
sentencing hearings and, therefore, its admission does not violate the Eighth
Amendment.53 However, the majority opinion also stated that, in some cases,
victim impact evidence may be so prejudicial as to present a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
51. See id. at 825 ("Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of inform-
ing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question .... ).
52. See id. ("mhe State has a legitimate interest in... reminding the sentencer that...
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to
his family." (alteration in original) (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 571 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting), overruled inpart by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991))).
53. See id. at 827 (holding that Eighth Amendment does not bar victim impact evidence).
To embellish the Court's conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion quoted a 1934
opinion by Justice Cardozo: "[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122
(1934)). Although this passage would appear to add a certain luster to the Court's holding, the
quote takes Justice Cardozo's words out of context. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the
Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready to Strike, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 85, 130 n.181 (1993) (discuss-
ing Payne's distortion of Justice Cardozo's language in Snyder). Snyder was a murder case in
which the prosecution successfully moved for ajury view of the gas station where the crime had
occurred. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 103. Snyder's counsel was present at the view and directed the
jury's attention to several specific areas of the gas station, as did the prosecutor. Id. at 103-04.
On appeal from his conviction, the defendant claimed that the trial court's denial of his motion
to be personally present at the view was a due process violation. Id. at 104-05. Because the
view presented only "gossamer possibilities of prejudice" to the defendant, the Court found that
no due process violation occurred. Id at 122. Victim impact evidence, however, is quite
different than ajury view, and victim impact evidence presents possibilities of unfair prejudice
that easily rise beyond the level of the "gossamer." See supra note 33 (providing examples of
victim impact evidence).
It is also interesting to note another context in which a member of the Supreme Court
invoked Justice Cardozo's words from Snyder. Protesting the majority's decision in Miranda
v. Arizona - requiring police officers to warn suspects of their constitutional rights before
questioning - Justice Harlan lamented that "confessions ... are to be sacrificed to the Court's
own finespun conception of fairness." Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 519 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Justice Harlan then dropped the following footnote: "[J]ustice, though due to
the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." Id. at 519 n.16 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (alteration in original) (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 122).
54. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 ("In the event that [victim impact] evidence is introduced
that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.").
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In a sharp dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens criticized the majority for
abandoning long-held requirements of relevance in favor of a politically
popular course: "Today... the Court abandons rules of relevance that are
older than the Nation itself and ventures into uncharted seas of irrelevance. ,
55
By presenting information about a murder victim's character and about the
impact of the murder on the victim's family, Justice Stevens argued, a risk
exists that thejury will consider facts that were unforeseeable to the defendant
at the time of the crime. 6 Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that no defined
point exists at which the fact of victim impact transforms a murder from one
meriting a life sentence to one meriting execution.57 The majority's un-
founded embrace of victim impact evidence and the resulting effects on
capital sentencing led Justice Stevens to characterize the occasion of the
Payne decision as "a sad day for a great institution.""8
IV The Aftermath of Payne
The language of the Court's holding in Payne was permissive in nature.59
Far from mandating the admission of victim impact evidence, the Payne Court
expressly left to the states the decision of whether to allow victim impact
evidence and argument.' ° Almost without exception, the death penalty states
have capitalized on the Court's open invitation to make victim impact evi-
dence a factor at capital sentencing hearings.61 Additionally, Congress has
enacted a law that allows juries to consider victim impact evidence at the
sentencing phase of capital trials in the federal system.62 Nonetheless, an
examination of victim impact evidence under the federal provisions and the
55. Id at 858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 863 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Court's holding "permits ajury to
sentence a defendant to death because of harm to the victim and his family that the defendant
could not foresee [and] which was not even identified until afterthe crime had been committed").
57. See id at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("mhe quantity and quality of victim impact
evidence sufficient to turn a verdict of life in prison into a verdict of death is not defined until
after the crime has been committed and therefore cannot possibly be applied consistently in
different cases.").
58. Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 827 ("We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of
victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment
erects no per se bar.").
60. See id. (stating that states "may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim
and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as
to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed" (emphasis added)).
61. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing measures that individual
states have taken to allow victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994) (providing that victim impact is factor that govern-
ment may use to justify death penalty).
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laws of Texas and Virginia demonstrates that the admission of such evidence
raises significant concerns.
A. Federal Law
Since the early days of the nation, federal law has authorized capital
punishment as a sentence for murder and other offenses.63 With the passage
of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (Act),' Congress significantly
expanded the scope of federal capital crimes.6' Although the number of
federal offenses punishable by death has increased dramatically, very few
individuals actually have received death sentences underthe new provisions."
However, the Oklahoma City bombing trials, most notably that of Timothy
McVeigh, brought considerable national attention to the federal death penalty
laws.67 Popular attention notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has yet to
consider a case involving the constitutionality of the Act.68
1. Statutory Provisions
The federal statutory definition of murder, now codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111, has remained virtually unchanged since 1909.69 Jurisdiction for
63. See MICHAEL KRoNENwETTEn, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: AREFERENCEHANDBOOK 13
(1993) (noting that Congress of United States, in its first session, passed laws providing capital
punishment for rape and murder).
64. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
65. See Charles Kenneth Eldred, Recent Development, The New FederalDeath Penalties,
22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 296-98 (1994) (listing approximately 60 federal capital offenses under
1994 provisions).
66. SeeMargaretA.JacobsMcVeighJuryNow WeighsExecution, ASeldom-UsedPenalty
in Federal Cases, WALL ST, J., June 4, 1997, at B I (noting that, at time of article's writing, only
13 individuals had received death sentences in federal court since adoption of new death penalty
laws, while several hundred individuals had received death sentences in state courts).
67. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 66 (discussing current federal death penalty provisions);
Steven K. Paulson, The McVeigh Verdict: Execution Far from Certain, CIN. ENQUIRER, June
4, 1997, at Al (noting that Supreme Court has not ruled on constitutionality of new federal
death penalty provisions); Richard A. Serrano, McVeigh GetsDeath Sentence, L.A. TIMES, June
15, 1997, at Al (discussing federal capital sentencing procedures).
The eleven capital counts in McVeigh's indictment included eight counts of first degree
murder inviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111. United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1571,1583 (D.
Colo. 1996). Federaljurisdictionexistedbecausetheeightvictimswerefederal employeesinthe
performance oftheirofficial duties. Id. Thejury'srecommendation ofthedeath sentence applied
collectively to all eleven counts. United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 318019,
at* 1 (D. Colo. June 13, 1997) (official trial transcript of special findings and recommendation).
68. See Paulson, supra note 67 (noting that Supreme Court has not evaluated new federal
death penalty laws).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 11 1(a) (1994) (defining murder and distinguishing between first and
second degree murder); Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, sec. 273, 35 Stat. 1088, 1143 (same).
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murder lies with the federal courts only when the murder occurs on federal
property or when other circumstances exist to make the offense a federal
one.7" The United States Code recognizes murder in the first and second
degrees.7 Of the two, only first degree murder carries a possible death
sentence. 2 After convicting a defendant for first degree murder, a federal jury
or court makes special findings as to which of the offered aggravating or
mitigating factors exist. 3 The sentencing body then weighs the applicable
aggravating factor or factors against any mitigating factors to determine
whether the defendant should receive a death sentence.74 If the sentencing
body recommends a sentence of death, the court must sentence the defendant
in accordance with that recommendation.
Any defendant who receives a sentence of death in federal court has a
right to have the court of appeals review the sentence.76 The reviewing court
must consider the entire record from the trial and the sentencing hearing, the
70. See Hackathom v. Decker, 243 F. Supp. 22, 24 (N.D. Tex. 1965) (noting that state
courts have jurisdiction over murder trials unless offense occurs on federal property or unless
other circumstances invoke federal jurisdiction), affd, 369 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1966).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 111 l(a) (defining murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought"). The distinction between first degree and second degree murder is
as follows:
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful,
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of,
or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage,
sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpe-
trated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of
any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. Any
other murder is murder in the second degree.
Id.
72. See id. § 1111(b) (establishing sentence for first degree murder as death or life
imprisonment).
73. See id. § 3593(d) (providing for return of special findings on aggravating and miti-
gating factors). For a list of the aggravating factors, see infra note 82. The mitigating factors
are as follows: the defendant had impaired capacity; the defendant was under duress; the
defendant, though punishable as a principal, had only minor participation in a homicide
committed by another; other defendants in the case are equally culpable, but they will not
receive a death sentence; the defendant had no prior criminal record; the defendant was under
severe mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide; the victim consented to the
conduct that caused the victim's death; and other, unenumerated factors that operate in mitiga-
tion. Id. § 3592(a)(1)-(8).
74. See id. § 3591(a) (providing for death sentence "if, after consideration of the factors
set forth in section 3592 in the course of a hearing held pursuant to section 3593, it is deter-
mined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified").
75. See id. § 3594 ("Upon a recommendation under section 3593(e) that the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the court shall
sentence the defendant accordingly.").
76. See id. § 3595 (providing automaticreview, at defendant's option, of death sentence).
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procedures by which the district court conducted the sentencing hearing, and
the sentencing body's special findings.77 If the court of appeals finds that the
sentencing body imposed the death penalty under the influence of passion or
prejudice, the court must remand for reconsideration of the sentence unless
the improper influence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.78 The
government bears the burden of demonstrating the harmlessness of any error
or impermissible influence. 79
The Act includes a provision that allows the admission of victim impact
evidence" at the sentencing phase." The statutory aggravating factors for
murder, however, do not include victim impact.82 Nonetheless, 18 U.S.C.
77. See id. (dictating scope of review in any case in which court imposes death sentence).
78. See id (mandating remand of sentence if"the sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor," unless error is harmless
beyond reasonable doubt).
79. See id. (noting that government bears burden of demonstrating harmlessness beyond
reasonable doubt).
80. See id. § 3593(c) (noting that "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibil-
ity under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials"). Because the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not apply to capital sentencings under the federal death penalty regime,
§ 3593 speaks in terms of "information" rather than in terms of "evidence." Id. For purposes
of consistency and clarity, this Note will refer to victim impact information in federal capital
sentencings as "victim impact evidence," although the term "evidence" in this context is not
strictly accurate.
81. See id. § 3593(a) (establishing procedures for capital sentencing proceedings). If the
attorney for the government wishes to seek the death sentence in an eligible case, § 3593
requires that:
[T]he attorney shall, a reasonable time before the trial or before acceptance by the
court of a plea of guilty, sign and file with the court, and serve on the defendant, a
notice - (1) stating that the government believes that the circumstances of the
offense are such that, if the defendant is convicted, a sentence of death is justified
under this chapter and that the government will seek the sentence of death; and
(2) setting forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defen-
dant is convicted, proposes to prove asjustifying a sentence of death. The factors
for which notice is provided under this subsection may include factors concerning
the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim'sfamily, and may include oral
testimony, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim ofthe offense and the
extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's
family, and any other relevant information.
Id. (emphasis added).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (providing aggravating factors for
homicide). The federal statutory aggravators are:
(1) Death during commission of another crime....
(2) Previous conviction of violent felony involving firearm....
(3) Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence of death or life impris-
onment was authorized....
(4) Previous conviction of other serious offenses....
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§ 3593, which governs the procedures at capital sentencing hearings, explic-
itly establishes victim impact as a factor on which the attorney for the govern-
ment may rely in seeking the death penalty. 3 If the government intends to
rely upon the victim impact factor, § 3593 requires that the government notify
the court and the defendant of this intention. 4
At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing body may consider the victim
impact factor if the government has given the appropriate notice under
§ 3592.85 The status of the victim impact factor, however, is not equivalent to
that of the sixteen aggravators that § 3592 explicitly sets forth.86 In contrast to
the mandatory consideration afforded to the enumerated aggravators of§ 3592,
consideration of victim impact is entirely permissive. Furthermore, a finding
that the government has proven the existence of victim impact is insufficient
to support a death sentence unless the sentencing body also finds the existence
(5) Grave risk of death to additional persons. -The defendant, in the commis-
sion of the offense, or in escaping apprehension for the violation of the offense,
knowingly created a grave risk of death to 1 or more persons in addition to the
victim of the offense.
(6) Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner ofcommitting offense. -The defendant
committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that
it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim.
(7) Procurement of offense by payment ...
(8) Pecuniary gain....
(9) Substantial planning and premeditation ....
(10) Conviction for two felony drug offenses ....
(11) Vulnerability ofvictim.-The victim was particularly vulnerable due to old
age, youth, or infirmity.
(12) Conviction for serious Federal drug offenses....
(13) Continuing criminal enterprise involving drug sales to minors....
(14) High public officials....
(15) Prior conviction of sexual assault or child molestation....
(16) Multiple killings or attempted killings....
Id. Additionally, the sentencing body "may consider whether any other aggravating factor for
which notice has been given exists." Id.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994) (providing for inclusion ofvictim impact as basis for
government to seek death penalty).
84. See id. (requiring government attorney to give notice to court and defendant of gov-
ernment's intention to seek death sentence and of aggravating factors by which government
seeks to justify death sentence).
85. See id. § 3592(c) (providing thatsentencing body may consider any aggravating factor
for which government has given notice).
86. See id. (enumerating 16 aggravating factors for homicide).
87. Compare id. ("[T]he jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall consider each of the
following [enumerated] aggravating factors for which notice has been given and determine
which, if any, exist... ." (emphasis added)) with id. ("The jury, or if there is no jury, the court,
may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists."
(emphasis added)).
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of at least one enumerated aggravator." Because of this arrangement within
the United States Code, victim impact is a nonstatutory aggravating factor.89
Section 3593 specifies that the nonstatutory victim impact factor may
include oral testimony or a victim impact statement. Additionally, the gov-
ernment may present any other relevant information to prove the victim impact
factor.9 The statutory language itself places no limits on what the court may
receive in this regard.' As a result, application of the victim impact factor at
a capital sentencing hearing is a potentially difficult proposition.93 Congress's
failure to provide more specific guidance regarding the admission of victim
impact evidence leaves much discretion to the district court. 94 In the exercise
of this discretion, the court must ensure that the sentencing body makes its
sentencing determination without passion or undue prejudice.95
2. Victim Impact Evidence Lacks Sufficient Probative Value
At the sentencing hearing under § 3593, the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not govern the admissibility of information.96 Section 3593, however,
includes two specific provisions that are analogous to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 97 The first states that information relevant to aggravating and
88. See id. § 3593(d) ("If no aggravating factor set forth in section 3592 is found to exist,
the court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law.").
89. See United Statesv. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938,947 (E.D. La. 1996) (noting thatvictim
impact is nonstatutory aggravator in federal capital sentencing).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994) (providingthatgovemment'svictim impactfactorfor
justifying death sentence may include victim impact statement or oral testimony).
91. See id. (stating that government's victim impact factor for justifying death sentence
may include "any other relevant information").
92. See id. (providing that "factors... may include oral testimony, a victim impact
statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss
suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other relevant information"); United
States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1491 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating that Congress did not
limit scope of victim impact evidence under § 3593).
93. See McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1491 (noting that victim impact factor in § 3593(a) is
"most problematical of all of the aggravating factors and may present the greatest difficulty in
determining the nature and scope of the 'information' to be considered").
94. See id. (noting that limitation on victim impact evidence under § 3593 is matter for
district court's discretion); Davis, 912 F. Supp. at 941 (noting that § 3593 imposes "substantial
responsibility and considerable discretion" on district court).
95. See McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1491 (noting that admission of information regarding
victim impact "must be determined with consideration for the constitutional limitation that the
jury must not be influenced by passion or prejudice").
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1994) ("Information is admissible regardless of its admissi-
bility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials .... ").
97. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing analogous provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 3593 and Federal Rules of Evidence).
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mitigating factors is admissible." Because the Act expressly permits the
introduction of victim impact information as a nonstatutory factor, it follows
thatvictim impact evidencewill satisfy § 3593's relevance requirementwhen-
ever the government gives the appropriate notice."
The second provision allows the court to exclude information if the
resulting risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the informa-
tion." Although clearly analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the
language of § 3593 suggests that a lower threshold for exclusion applies at a
capital sentencing hearing.' The nearly identical text of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 provides that courts may exclude relevant evidence if the risk of
unfairprejudice substantiallyoutweighs the probativevalue. 112 Becauseofthis
distinction, § 3593 appears to require the district courts to apply a particularly
demanding standard to victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings. '03
Against this standard for exclusion, the statutory authorization for the
death sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3591, becomes extremely significant."° Section
3591 provides for imposition of the death sentence only after a determination
that the sentence is justified. °5 Although § 3593 governs the procedures at
the hearing held to make this determination, § 3593 does not displace § 3591
as the substantive law regarding the death penalty."°6 In turn, § 3591 unequiv-
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) ("[linformation may be presented as to any matter relevant
to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor permitted or required to be
considered under section 3592."); cf FED. R. EviD. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (requiring government to give notice of aggravating factor
relating to victim impact); id § 3593(c) (allowing government to present evidence relevant to
any aggravating factor for which government has given notice under § 3593(a)).
100. See id. ("[Ifnformation may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the
danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.").
101. Compare id. ("[I]nformation may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by
the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.") with FED.
R. EVID. 403 ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading thejury ..... (emphasis
added)).
102. See FED. R. EviD. 403 ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury ...... (emphasis added)).
103. Seesupra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between exclu-
sion provisions of § 3593 and Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) (1994) (authorizing sentence of death upon satisfaction of
several preconditions).
105. See id. (providing for imposition of death sentence in eligible cases if "it is deter-
mined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified").
106. See id. (noting that § 3593 governs sentencing hearing).
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ocally establishes that thejustification of the death sentence is dependent only
upon "consideration of the factors set forth in section 3592."17 As a non-
statutory aggravating factor, victim impact is not "set forth" in § 3592."' To
the contrary, § 3592 does not mention any factor involving victim impact. 9
Rather, § 3593 contains the Act's only provision for the victim impact factor,
which only the government may set forth."' Thus, the ultimate sentencing
determination that § 3591 requires does not include victim impact."'
Because the sentencing provision of § 3591 refers only to statutory
aggravating factors, evidence relating to the nonstatutory factor of victim
impact has little or no probative value in the sentencing determination."' The
considerable danger of unfair prejudice that typically accompanies the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence will therefore outweigh the low probative
value attributable to the evidence in all but the most aberrant cases."3 For this
reason, federal district courts should refuse to admit victim impact evidence
in capital sentencing proceedings unless such evidence has a tendency to
prove a statutorily enumerated aggravator.1
4
B. Texas
Texas's statutory capital sentencing scheme does not explicitly provide
for the admission ofvictim impact testimony prior to sentencing."' However,
Texas does have a unique statutory provision known as postsentence victim
allocution." 6 Article 42.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure ex
107. Id.
108. Cf id. § 3593(d) (distinguishing between "any aggravating factor or factors set forth
in section 3592... and any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under"
§ 3593(a)).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(1994 & Supp. 1996) (enumerating aggravating factors, which
do not include reference to victim impact).
110. See id. § 3593(a) (allowing governmentto rely upon victim impact evidence ifit gives
notice of intent).
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) (1994) (authorizing sentence of death upon "consideration
of the factors set forth in section 3592"); id. § 3592(c) (setting forth aggravating factors, none
of which include victim impact).
112. See id. § 3591(a) (authorizing sentence of death upon "consideration of the factors
set forth in section 3592").
113. See id. § 3593(c) (providing for exclusion of evidence if danger of unfair prejudice
outweighs probative value).
114. See id. (providing for exclusion of evidence if danger of unfair prejudice outweighs
probative value).
115. See TEx. CODECRlM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1999) (establishing procedure
for sentencing phase of capital cases).
116. See Keith D. Nicholson, Comment, Would You Like More Salt with That Wound?
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pressly allows a family member of the victim to appear personally and to
address the court and the defendant regarding the impact of the murder." 7
Any such appearance, however, must occur after the imposition of sentence.1 8
Because the court will have already fixed and announced the sentence, article
42.03 represents an attempt to provide an emotional release for the victim's
family members without affecting the defendant's punishment. 9 Notwith-
standing the codified provision for postsentence victim input, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals 2 ' has chosen to allow victim impact evidence prior to
sentencing.' In light of this choice, it is necessary to examine the applicable
statutory provisions to determine the propriety of victim impact evidence at
capital sentencing hearings in Texas."
1. Statutory Provisions
The Texas Penal Code distinguishes between murder in the first and
second degrees."z Eight statutory predicates - based on the status of the
Post-Sentence Victim Allocution in Texas, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 1103, 1105 (1995) (describing
Texas's procedure as "post-sentence victim allocution").
117. See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.03(I)(b) (allowing family member of victim to
make postsentence statement to court and defendant). Article 42.03 provides:
The court shall permit a... close relative of a deceased victim ... to appear in
person to present to the court and to the defendant a statement of the person's views
about the offense, the defendant, and the effect of the offense on the victim.
The... relative ... may not direct questions to the defendant while making the
statement. The court reporter may not transcribe the statement. The statement must
be made... after sentence is pronounced.
ld
118. See id. (allowing family member of victim to make postsentence statement to court
and defendant).
119. See Nicholson, supra note 116, at 1117 (noting that article 42.03 is of benefit to
family members of victim rather than of detriment to defendant).
120. See PAMELA R TEPPER & PEGGY N. KERLEY, TExAS LEGAL RESEARCH 44 (2d ed.
1997) (stating that Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is court of last resort for criminal matters
in Texas).
121. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing rulings of Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on
victim impact evidence).
122. See infra Part W.B.1 (discussing Texas's statutory provisions for capital murder and
sentencing).
123. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)-(d) (West 1994) (defining murder). Texas
defines murder as follows:
A person commits [murder] if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of an individual; or
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victim, the circumstances of the crime, or the tender age of the victim -
elevate the offense to capital murder. 4 Upon a defendant's conviction for
capital murder, the trial court conducts a sentencing proceeding pursuant to
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071." At the sentencing
hearing, the court may admit any evidence that it deems relevant to the sen-
tence.
2 6
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight
from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
Id. § 19.02(b). Although all murders are presumptively first degree, id. § 19.02(d), the defen-
dant may raise and prove the issue of"immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an
adequate cause," which reduces the offense to second degree murder. lad § 19.02(d).
124. See id. § 19.03 (defining capital murder). Texas law defines capital murder as any
murder in which:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful dis-
charge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or
attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault,
arson, or obstruction or retaliation;
(3) the person commits the murderforremuneration or the promise ofremuneration
or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another:
(A) who is employed in the operation of the penal institution; or
(B) with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or
in the profits of a combination;
(6) the person:
(A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section or Section 19.02,
murders another; or
(B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years...
murders another;
(7) the person murders more than one person:
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(3) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed
pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct; or
(8) the person murders an individual under six years of age.
Iad
125. See TEX. CODECRim. P. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1999) (mandating procedures
for sentencing phase of capital trials).
126. See id. art. 37.071(2)(a) (stating that prosecution and defense may present evidence
on "any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence"); see also Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d
379, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (noting that trial court has "wide discretion in
admitting or excluding evidence" at sentencing phase of capital trial (quoting Smith v. State,
676 S.W.2d 379, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc))).
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After the parties present evidence and argument, the court presents two
threshold issues to the jury. 7 The first issue requires the jury to determine
whether the defendant presents a risk of future dangerousness.2 The second
issue, which applies only to cases that involve capital murder by complicity,
requires a determination of whether the defendant actually did the killing or
whether the defendant intended or anticipated that a killing would take
place.' If the jury unanimously finds that the prosecution has proved both
issues beyond a reasonable doubt, the court then presents a third issue. 30
Under this final issue, the jury must determine whether sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist to compel a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a
sentence of death.' In making this determination, the jury must consider all
the evidence relating to the murder, including the circumstances of the mur-
der, the defendant's personal characteristics, and the defendant's moral
culpability.' To impose a death sentence, the jury must unanimously agree
that the mitigating circumstances do not support leniency for the defendant.'
127. See T"x. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b) (requiring that court submit two
sentencing issues to jury).
128. See id. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (requiringjury to consider "whetherthere is aprobability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society").
129. See id art. 37.071(2)(b)(2)(requiringjuryto consider"whetherthedefendantactually
caused the death of the deceased or did not actually cause the death of the deceased but intended
to kill the deceased or another or anticipated that a human life would be taken" when jury finds
defendant guilty of capital murder under complicity theory).
130. See id. art. 37.071(2)(e) (requiring submission of third issue upon sentencing body's
affirmative findings on first two issues).
131. See id (noting scope ofjury's consideration for capital sentencing issue). The third
issue for the jury states:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances
of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and the personal moral
culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence
be imposed.
Id. Subsection (2)(e) of article 37.071 represents a statutory codification of Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989), in which the Supreme Court required Texas juries to consider all the
defendant's relevant mitigating evidence at capital sentencing. Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d
591,598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en bane) (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 326-28). Because of this
origin, the Court of Criminal Appeals has referred to subsection (2)(e) as the "Penry issue."
Smith v. State, 919 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en bane) (plurality opinion).
132. See TEX. CODECRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(e) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring jury to
consider all evidence, including circumstances of offense, defendant's character and back-
ground, and personal moral culpability of defendant).
133. See id. art. 37.071(2)(f) (requiring jury to agree unanimously before returning nega-
tive finding on mitigation issue).
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Upon a jury's unanimous negative finding on the mitigation issue, the court
must sentence the defendant to death. 34 In all other cases, the court must
impose a sentence of life imprisonment."5
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals automatically review any case in which the defendant receives the
death sentence." 6 In turn, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure establish
the standard of review that the Court of Criminal Appeals must apply.37 Ifthe
court finds a constitutional error in the sentencing phase, reversal of the
sentence is mandatory unless the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error did not contribute to the sentencing decision."3
2. Victim Impact Evidence and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
In 1996, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first addressed the admissi-
bility of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings.'39 The first
case, Ford v. State,'"° involved an attack on a family that left one person dead
and two others seriously injured.' On appeal from his conviction and
sentence of death, Ford argued that the trial court erred in allowing members
134. See id. art. 37.071(2)(g) (requiring court to sentence defendant to death upon jury's
unanimous negative finding on mitigation issue).
135. See id. (requiring court to impose sentence of life imprisonment in all cases in which
jury does not return unanimous negative finding on mitigation issue or in which jury does not
make affirmative finding on subsection (b) issues).
136. See id art. 37.071(h) (providing automatic review ofjudgment of conviction and
sentence of death).
137. See TEx. R. APP. P. 44.2 (West 1998) (establishing standard of review).
138. See id. ("If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error that is
subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse ajudgment of conviction or
punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the conviction or punishment.").
139. Cf Goffv. State, 931 S.W.2d 537,554-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (plural-
ity opinion) (rejecting Goffs argument that trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence of
victim's homosexuality), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1438 (1997); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d
199,218 n.17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (stating thatPayne does not allow defendants
to present evidence relating to victim's bad character).
140. 919 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
141. SeeFordv. State, 919 S.W.2d 107,109-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (describ-
ing evidence presented at trial). In Ford, the defendant entered the home of Myra Concepcion
Murillo and shot Murillo's son Armando in the back of the head. Id Ajury convicted Ford of
capital murder. Id. at 109. At sentencing, the jury heard testimony from the three survivors of
the shooting and from Armando's fatherregarding the effects ofArmando's death on the family.
Id. at 112-13. The trial court sentenced Ford to death. Id at 109. The Court of Criminal
Appeals did not determine whether the victim impact testimony was relevant to the defendant's
sentence, but it reviewed the trial court's admission of the testimony under an abuse of discre-
tion standard. Id at 115. The court upheld the admission of the family members' testimony as
being "at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement." Id. at 115-16.
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of the victim's family, including the injured survivors, to testify at the sen-
tencing phase as to how the crime had impacted their lives.142 The Court of
Criminal Appeals, after discussing Payne and the relevance of victim impact
evidence under Texas law, concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the testimony. 43 Although Ford suggests the accep-
tance of victim impact evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeals failed to
determine whether such evidence was relevant to capital sentencing in Texas
as a matter of law.1"
In Smith v. State,145 decided the same day as Ford, the defendant argued
that the trial court erred in allowing testimony from two prosecution witnesses
regarding the positive characteristics of the murder victim, who was a female
teacher.146 A plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals found that victim
impact evidence regarding a victim's character was not relevant to the statu-
tory sentencing issue of future dangerousness. 47 As to the remaining sentenc-
ing issue, that of whether a defendant merits life imprisonment rather than
death, the plurality found that the legislature did not intend victim impact
evidence to be included in the class of evidence relevant to the sentence
because the Eighth Amendment prohibited victim impact evidence at the
time Texas codified the mitigation issue."' As a result, the plurality decided
that evidence pertaining to the victim's character was admissible only if it
142. See id. at 114 (noting defendant's appellate claims regarding testimony of victim's
family members).
143. See id. at 115-16 (finding that trial court's decision to admit victim impact testimony
was "at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement").
144. See id (concluding that, on facts of case, trial court's decision to admit victim impact
testimony was not abuse of discretion).
145. 919 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
146. See Smith v. State, 919 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (noting defendant's argument that trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding
victim's good character). In Smith, ajury convicted the defendant of the capital murder of a
female teacher. Id. at 97. At sentencing, the state presented testimony from a coworker of the
victim regarding the victim's dedication to teaching. Id. The state also elicited testimony from
the victim's sister regarding the positive personal characteristics and accomplishments of the
victim. Id. The plurality discussed Payne and its application in Oregon and Utah cases wherein
the courts of those states concluded that victim impact evidence was inadmissible at capital
sentencing. Id. at 100-01. After noting that the Eighth Amendment prohibited victim impact
evidence when Texas adopted its statutory sentencing scheme, the plurality held that evidence
of the victim's good character was inadmissible unless it was directly related to the circum-
stances of the offense or was offered in rebuttal. Id. at 102. However, the plurality found the
trial court's admission of victim impact evidence harmless because of its relatively minor role
in Smith's sentencing hearing. Id. at 103.
147. See id. at 102 (determining that evidence of personal characteristics of victim is
irrelevant to determination of defendant's future dangerousness).
148. See id. (explaining that Eighth Amendment prohibited admission of victim impact
evidence when legislature enacted article 37.071(2)(e)).
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related to the circumstances of the offense or if the government presented it
in rebuttal. 
149
The Court of Criminal Appeals next addressed victim impact evidence
in Janecka v. State.50 Janecka received a sentence of death after being
convicted of the for-hire murder of an infant.' At the sentencing phase, the
government presented testimony from a former assistant district attorney who
had been involved in an earlier stage of the case. 152 This witness testified
about the profound personal impact that resulted from his involvement in the
case and stated that he still kept a picture of the murdered infant in his
office. 153 The court found that the trial judge erred in admitting this victim
impact testimony because it was not relevant to any issues in the case.'54
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the error did not contribute to the jury's
sentencing decision and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'
55
In 1997, the Court of Criminal Appeals again considered the admissibil-
ity of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings. 156 The plurality
149. See id. ("[W]e hold art. 37.071 does not permit the admission of victim impact evi-
dence and such is inadmissible as a matter of law to the extent it is not directly related to the
circumstances of the offense or necessary for rebuttal.").
150. 937 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
151. See Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en bane), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 86 (1997). In Janecka, the defendant received a death sentence after his
conviction for capital murder, namely the murder of an infant for remuneration. Id. Several
years earlier, Janeckahad received the same sentence for the same crime, but the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals had reversed his conviction and had ordered a retrial. Id. at 460 n.1. At the sen-
tencing hearing that followed the defendant's second conviction for the murder, the jury heard
testimony from Ted Poe, a sitting state judge who, as assistant district attorney, had prosecuted
Janecka's first trial. Id. at 473. Poe testified about the significant personal impact that resulted
from his involvement in the case, and he told thejury that he still kept a picture of the murdered
infant in his office. Id. Reviewing Janecka's conviction and sentence upon retrial, the Court
of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court erred in admitting Poe's testimony because the
testimony had no relevance to any issues at trial. Id. Nonetheless, the Court of Criminal
Appeals found that the testimony did not contribute to the jury's sentencing decision and was
therefore harmless. Id.
152. See id. (noting that prosecution presented testimony of Ted Poe, sitting state judge
who was prosecutor in Janecka's original trial for same murder).
153. See id. (quoting witness's testimony regarding impact of murder of infant).
154. See id. (finding that admission of victim impact testimony was erroneous because
testimony had no relevance to any issue).
155. See id. (finding that erroneous admission of victim impact testimony was harmless
beyond reasonable doubt).
156. See Johnson v. State, No. 72,046, 1997 WL 209527, at * 1 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 30,
1997) (plurality opinion) (noting appellant's argument against admission of victim impact testi-
mony from victims' family members), reh'ggrantedand opinion withdrawn, No. 72,046 (Tex.
Crim. App. Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished decision on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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in Johnson v. State,5 ' an opinion that the court subsequently withdrew,
rejected Johnson's argument that the trial court erred in admitting victim
impact testimony from the mothers of the two murder victims.""8 Responding
to Johnson's contention that the precedents regarding victim impact evidence
were ambiguous, however, the plurality summarized the case law governing
the admission of victim impact evidence in Texas.' In this summary, the
plurality identified seven specific constraints on the admission of victim
157. No. 72,046, 1997 WL 209527 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 1997).
158. See Johnson v. State, No. 72,046, 1997 WL 209527, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr.
30, 1997) (plurality opinion) (noting that Johnson made general objection to victim impact
testimony at trial and thus trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting evidence), reh'g
granted and opinion withdrawn, No. 72,046 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished
decision on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In Johnson, the jury convicted
appellant of capital murder and the trial court sentenced him to death. Id. at * 1. On appeal,
Johnson argued that the penalty phase testimony from the victims' mothers was unduly
prejudicial. Id. Noting Johnson's contention that Texas law regarding victim impact evidence
was ambiguous, the plurality discussed Ford, Smith, Goff, and Janecka. Id. at *2-4. The plur-
ality then proceeded to summarize the current state of Texas law on victim impact evidence
under the court's decisions. Id. at *4. Ultimately, the plurality found that the trial court's
admission of the victim impact evidence at the sentencing hearing did not constitute an abuse
of discretion. Id at *8.
On rehearing, the court again found that the admission of the victim impact testimony was
not erroneous. The court's per curiam opinion merely quoted a lengthy passage from Mosley
v. State, No. 72,281, 1998 WL 349513 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 1998), and "reaffirm[ed]" that
case, which the court decided 14 months after the original opinion in Johnson. See Johnson,
No. 72,046, at 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished decision on file with the
Washington andLee Law Review); see also infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Mosley).
159. See id. at *4 (summarizing Texas law on victim impact evidence). The plurality
summarized Texas law regarding victim impact evidence as follows:
[W]e recognize the admissibility of victim impact evidence if it meets the
following criteria: (1) the evidence must be relevant to a special issue during
punishment or offered to rebut a defensive punishment theory, Ford, supra; (2) the
probative value cannot be outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, Goff,
supra; (3) the testimony must come from either a surviving victim of the crime
itself, or from a family member or legal guardian of a victim of the crime, Ford,
Smith, and Janecka, supra; (4) the testimony must regard the impact the crime has
had on that individual's life, Ford, supra; (5) that testimony cannot create a com-
parative judgment situation, i.e., it must show the uniqueness of the loss of the
victim as an individual only as it pertains to the immediate family, guardian or
surviving victim, Payne, and Smith, supra; and (6) the evidence may not pertain to
the character of the victim unless it is introduced in rebuttal of a defensive theory
offered during punishment. See Goff, and Janecka, supra. Furthermore, (7) the
testimony may not discuss the value of the individual to the community, as such
testimony could create a comparative judgment situation which the Supreme Court
in Payne expressly discouraged.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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impact evidence. 6 ' First, the evidence must be relevant to the sentencing
issues that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071 sets forth, or the
prosecution must have offered the evidence in rebuttal to the defendant's
argument at sentencing. 161 Second, the probative value of the victim impact
evidence must outweigh any danger of undue prejudice." Third, only family
members of a victim, legal guardians of a victim, or individuals who are
surviving victims of the crime in question may furnish victim impact evi-
dence.'63 Fourth, the testimony must address the impact of the crime on the
witness's life."M Fifth, the testimony must not effect a comparison between
the value ofthe victim's life and the value ofthe defendant's life. 61 Sixth, the
victim impact evidence may address the victim's character only in rebuttal to
the defendant's argument.'66 Finally, the prosecution may not present evi-
dence that characterizes the victim's death as a loss to the community. 67
160. See id. (summarizing Texas law on victim impact evidence).
161. See id. (stating that victim impact "evidence must be relevant to a special issue during
punishment or offered to rebut a defensive punishment theory").
162. See id. (stating that probative value of victim impact evidence "cannot be outweighed
by the danger of undue prejudice").
163. See id. (stating that "testimony must come from either a surviving victim of the crime
itself, or from a family member or legal guardian of a victim of the crime").
164. See id. (stating that "testimony must regard the impact the crime has had on that
individual's life").
165. See id. (stating that "testimony cannot create a comparative judgment situation, i.e.,
it must show the uniqueness of the loss of the victim as an individual only as it pertains to the
immediate family, guardian or surviving victim").
166. See id. (stating that "evidence may not pertain to the character of the victim unless it
is introduced in rebuttal of a defensive theory offered during punishment"). The plurality noted
that this constraint on victim impact evidence was consistent with the court's holding in
Armstrong v. State, which represents the Court of Criminal Appeals's traditional view on evi-
dence offered by the prosecution to demonstrate the victim's nonviolent nature. Id. at *4 n.6
(plurality opinion). The Court of Criminal Appeals in Armstrong announced the rule as
follows:
It is never competent for the State in the first instance to prove that the person slain
was peaceable and inoffensive. Such evidence becomes admissible in rebuttal
when the opposite has been testified to in behalf of the defense, or when the
defendant seeks to justify the homicide on the ground of threats made by the
deceased.
Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (quoting Arthur v.
State, 339 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960)).
167. See Johnson v. State, No. 72,046, 1997 WL 209527, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 30,
1997) (plurality opinion) (stating that "testimony may not discuss the value of the individual to
the community, as such testimony could create a comparative judgment situation which the
Supreme Court in Payne expressly discouraged"), reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn, No.
72,046 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished decision on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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In a concurring opinion, Judge McCormick likewise sought to clarify
Texas law regarding victim impact evidence.16 Based on the various opinions
in Ford and Smith, Judge McCormick determined that a majority of the Court
of Criminal Appeals had ruled that evidence concerning the effects of the
murder on the victim's family is admissible.69 Additionally, he interpreted
the Ford and Smith decisions as barring the prosecution from presenting
evidence regarding the character and background of the murder victim.7 °
One year after the original decision in Johnson, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in Mosley v. State.7' acknowledged the uncertainty created
by the court's fractured decisions regarding victim character and victim
impact evidence.'" In affirming Mosley's conviction for murder in the course
of a robbery, a five-member majority of the court announced that victim
character and victim impact evidence are admissible at capital sentencing
hearings.73 The majority cited the article 37.071(2)(e) special sentencing
issue - the mitigation issue - as the proper context for victim character and
victim impact evidence. 74 Under the court's conception of mitigation, the
prosecution may present victim character and victim impact evidence to
demonstrate the "uniqueness" of the murder victim and the harm caused by the
defendant, as well as to rebut the defendant's mitigating evidence. 75
168. See id. at *15 n.1 (McCormick, J., concurring) (discussing opinions inFordandSmith
and utilizing United States Supreme Court's method for determining holding of fragmented
court).
169. See id (McCormick, J., concurring) ("Amajority of this Court apparently has decided
that 'victim impact' evidence relating to the effects of the crime on the victim's family is
admissible.").
170. See ide (McCormick, J., concurring) ("[A] majority of this Court apparently has
decided that 'victim impact' evidence relating to the victim's character and background is not
admissible.").
171. No. 72,281, 1998 WL349513 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 1998).
172. See Mosley v. State, No. 72,281, 1998 WL 349513, at *13-14 (Tex. Crim. App. July
1, 1998) (en banc) (discussing opinions in Ford, Smith, and Johnson), petition for cert. filed,
No. 98-7262 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1998). In Mosley, a jury convicted DaRoyce Mosley of capital
murder in connection with the robbery of a bar. Id. at * 1. In accordance with the jury's
findings on the article 37.071 capital sentencing issues, the trial judge sentenced Mosley to
death. Id. On appeal, Mosley argued that the trial court should not have allowed the prosecu-
tion to present evidence of the victim's character during the sentencing phase. Id. at * 12. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed and established a rule stating that victim impact and victim
character evidence are admissible at capital sentencing. Id. at *14.
173. See id. ("Both victim impact and victim character evidence are admissible, in the
context of the mitigation special issue, to show the uniqueness of the victim, the harm caused
by the defendant, and as rebuttal to the defendant's mitigating evidence.").
174. Id
175. See id (finding that "victim impact and victim character evidence [are] admissible in
the context of the mitigation special issue, to show the uniqueness of the victim, the harm
caused by the defendant, and as rebuttal to the defendant's mitigating evidence").
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The Mosley court did, however, indicate two limitations on victim char-
acter and victim impact evidence. 76 First, evidence relating to the victim is
inadmissible if it tends to compare the value of the murder victim's life to the
lives of other individuals. ' Second, the court stated without explanation that
the mitigating evidence presented by the defendant should be a factor in the
trial court's decision to admit victim impact or victim character evidence at
all.'78 Notwithstanding these limitations, Mosley and the above cases clearly
indicate that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined to admit
victim character and victim impact evidence at capital sentencing.
179
3. Victim Impact Evidence Is Not Relevant
Each of Texas's statutory predicates to capital murder is dependent upon
one or two specified facts relating to the victim's employment, the circum-
stances of the murder, or the victim's youth."8' Victim impact evidence, how-
ever, has no tendency to make the existence of any of these facts more or less
176. See id. (noting limits on admission of victim character and victim impact evidence).
177. See id. (noting that evidence tending to "measur[e] the worth of the victim compared
to other members of society" is inadmissible).
178. Id ("[M]itigating evidence introduced by the defendant may also be considered in
evaluating whether the State may subsequently offer victim-related testimony.").
179. But cf Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 637 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (holding
victim impact evidence as to victim not named in defendant's indictment irrelevant under article
37.071), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 557 (1997). Ajury convicted Cantu of the capital murder of
Jennifer Ertman. Id. at 630. After the jury answered the article 37.071 special issues, the trial
judge sentenced Cantu to death. Id at 631. Ertman's murder was part of a transaction in which
Cantu and several companions had robbed, sexually assaulted, and murdered Ertman and Eliza-
beth Pena. Id. Cantu's indictment, however, charged only the capital murder of Ertman, and
it did not name Pena. Id. at 630. At the sentencing phase, Elizabeth Pena's mother testified
about Elizabeth's good character, the search for Elizabeth's body, and the impact of Elizabeth's
death on the family members. Id. at 636. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals noted
that Elizabeth Pena was not the victim for whose death the jury was sentencing Cantu. Id. at
637. Accordingly, the court held that the testimony of Pena's mother was irrelevant to the
sentencing phase special issues mandated by article 37.071. Id. Under Payne, the court found
such "[e]xtraneous victim impact evidence" to serve "no purpose other than to inflame thejury."
Id. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the testimony did not contribute to the sentencing decision
and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 637-38.
The Court of Criminal Appeals decided Cantu on January 29, 1997, approximately three
months before the original decision in Johnson.
180. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing elements of capital murder as
codified in Texas). Texas's statutory scheme does not elevate murder to capital murder based
on the mere brutality ofthe killing. Cf TENN. CODEANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 1998) (establish-
ing aggravator for murders that are "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995) (establishing aggravator for murders that are "outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman").
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probable.' As to the first sentencing issue, victim impact evidence is not
probative of the factors that Texas generally recognizes as indicative of a
defendant's future dangerousness.1 12 The future dangerousness factors are of
two types; either they relate to the circumstances of the actual killing, or they
are specific to the personal characteristics of the defendant." 3 Evidence relat-
ing to the character of the victim or to the indirect effects of the murder simply
has no tendency to prove any of the factors that Texas recognizes as indicative
of future dangerousness. Likewise, victim impact evidence has no relevance to
the second sentencing issue, which applies only in complicity cases and ad-
dresses whether or not the defendant caused or anticipated the killing.'
Perhaps mindful of this relevance problem, the Court of Criminal Appeals
has relied upon the "personal moral culpability" component of the third statu-
tory sentencing issue as a justification for the admission of victim impact
evidence."5 By its ownterms, however, thethird sentencing issue addressesthe
appropriateness of mitigation, and only mitigation, of the defendant's sen-
tence."86 Becausethis issue establishes asafeguardforthe defendantratherthan
a further opportunity for the government to secure a sentence of death, any
victim impact evidence that tends to support imposition of the death penalty is
irrelevant to moral culpability under the third sentencing issue.8 7
181. Cf TEx. R. EviD. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
182. See Smith v. State, 919 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (noting that victim impact evidence was not relevantto future dangerousness); see also
Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (listing factors relating
to future dangerousness).
183. See Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at6l (explaining thatfactors relating to future dangerousness
include circumstances ofmurder, calculated nature of defendant's acts, defendant's forethought
and deliberateness in executing crime, existence and severity of prior crimes, defendant's age
and personal circumstances, presence or lack of duress affecting defendant, defendant's psychi-
atric state, and defendant's character).
184. See TEX. CODECRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (requiringjury
to consider "whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually
cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another or anticipated that
a human life would be taken" whenjury finds defendant guilty of capital murder under complic-
ity theory).
185. See McDuffv. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 620 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (noting that
murder's impact on sister of victim "would... appear to be a legitimate factor in assessing
one's moral culpability"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 125 (1997); Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107,
115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (noting that mitigation issue directs jury's attention to
defendant's "personal moral culpability").
186. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting that third sentencing issue relates
to mitigation of sentence).
187. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting that third sentencing issue relates
to mitigation of sentence).
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Because victim impact evidence is not relevant to the sentencing issues
and because of the inflammatory nature of such evidence, the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals should hold victim impact evidence inadmissible as a matter of
law.' Family members of murder victims will retain their statutory right to
address the court after the imposition of sentence, thereby obviating any
concern that the impact of a murder will go unnoticed.' 9 Even without a
bright-line rule from the Court of Criminal Appeals, however, trial courts
should exclude victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings because
the evidence is irrelevant to the sentencing determination. 90
C. Virginia
In 1998, Virginia enacted its first statutory provision for the presentation
of victim impact testimony to a capital sentencing jury. '9 Prior to this enact-
ment, the sole Virginia statute concerning victim impact evidence in capital
cases only required the judge to receive a written victim impact statement
before imposing sentence when the jury recommended a death sentence. 92
188. Cf Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 637 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (holding that
victim impact evidence pertaining to "extraneous" victim is inadmissible at capital sentencing
because of irrelevance and danger of unfair prejudice to defendant), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 557
(1997); supra note 179 (discussing Cantu).
189. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing Texas's statutory provi-
sion for postsentence victim allocution).
190. See TEX. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); TEx. R. EviD. 402 ("Evi-
dence which is not relevant is inadmissible.").
191. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie Supp. 1998) ("In any [capital sentencing]
proceeding..., the court shall permit the victim.., to testify in the presence of the accused
regarding the impact of the offense upon the victim.").
192. See VA. CODEMNN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1996) (mandating inclusion ofvictim impact
statement in postsentence report for court's consideration). The Virginia Crime Victim and
Witness Rights Act's internal definition of victim includes "a spouse, parent or legal gurdian"
of a homicide victim, unless such person committed the homicide. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-
11.01 (Michie Supp. 1998). If the victim personally prepares the victim impact statement, the
statement must be in writing and may consist of the victim's own words. See id § 19.2-299.1.
If someone other than the victim prepares the victim impact statement, the statement shall:
(i) [I]dentify the victim, (ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a
result ofthe offense, (iii) identify the nature and extent of any physical orpsychologi-
cal injury suffered by the victim as aresultofthe offense, (iv) detail any change in the
victim's personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships as aresultofthe offense,
(v) identify any request for psychological or medical services initiated by the victim
or the victim's family as a result of the offense, and (vi) provide such other informa-
tion as the court may require related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.
VICTIM IMPACTEVIDENCE
Even before the enactment of the statutory authorization for victim impact
evidence at capital sentencing, however, the Virginia Supreme Court in two
decisions had judicially expanded the sentencing provisions to allow the
introduction of victim impact evidence.'93 In light of these decisions and the
1998 statutory amendment, it is necessary to examine the law governing
capital murder in Virginia.194
1. Statutory Provisions
The Code of Virginia divides murder into three classes: capital, 95 first
degree, and second degree.1 96 As the names suggest, only capital murder
carries a possible penalty of death. 97 Capital murder requires the combination
of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing and one of several other fac-
tors, which depend upon characteristics of the defendant, characteristics of the
victim, or the circumstances surrounding the homicide.'98
193. See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994) (holding that victim
impact testimony was relevant to punishment in capital murder prosecution); see also Beck v.
Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (Va.) (extending Weeks holding to include victim
impacttestimony from individuals beyond victim's family), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 608 (1997).
194. See infra Part IV.C. I (discussing Virginia's statutory provisions for capital murder
and sentencing).
195. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 1998) (defining capital murder and
identifying it as Class 1 felony).
196. See id. § 18.2-32 (defining first degree murder and identifying it as Class 2 felony,
and defining all murder other than capital and first degree murder as second degree murder).
197. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-10 (Michie 1996) (authorizing punishment of death for
Class I felonies); id. § 18.2-31 (establishing capital murder as Class 1 felony).
198. See id, § 18.2-31 (defining capital murder). Virginia's statutory definition of capital
murder is as follows:
1. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commis-
sion of abduction, as defined in § 18.2-48, when such abduction was committed
with the intent to extort money or a pecuniary benefit or with the intent to defile the
victim of such abduction;
2. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another for
hire;
3. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by a prisoner
confined in a state or local correctional facility... or while in the custody of an
employee thereof;
4. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commis-
sion of robbery or attempted robbery;
5. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commis-
sion of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted
forcible sodomy or object sexual penetration;
6. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a law-enforcement offi-
cer.., when such killing is for the purpose of interfering with the performance of
his official duties;
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Upon conviction for capital murder, a defendant is not eligible to receive
a sentence of death unless the prosecution proves the existence of one or both
of Virginia's statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt.'99 The two
aggravators are the future dangerousness of the defendant and the vileness of
the murder itself" ° In addition to finding at least one aggravating factor, the
jury must also recommend a sentence of death before the court may consider
imposing the death penalty.20'
7. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person as a
part of the same act or transaction;
8. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ofmore than one person with-
in a three-year period;
9. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commis-
sion of or attempted commission of [a drug offense,] when such killing is for the
purpose of furthering the commission or attempted commission of such violation;
10. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another pur-
suant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in a continuing criminal
enterprise ... ;
11. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a pregnant woman by one
who knows that the woman is pregnant and has the intent to cause the involuntary
termination of the woman's pregnancy without a live birth; and
12. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person under the age of
fourteen by a person age twenty-one or older.
Id.
199. See id. § 19.2-264.4 (noting that defendant cannot receive death sentence unless gov-
ernment proves either future dangerousness of defendant or vileness of offense, and sentencing
body proceeds to recommend death sentence); Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 150
(Va. 1978) (stating that courts may not impose death sentence unless prosecution proves either
or both aggravators beyond reasonable doubt).
200. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995) (establishing conditions for imposi-
tion of death penalty). Section 19.2-264.2 states:
[A] sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after
consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant, find that
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute acontinuing seriousthreatto society orthathis conduct in commit-
ting the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be imposed.
Id.
201. See id. (noting that defendant cannot receive death sentence unless court orjury finds
either future dangerousness of defendant or vileness of offense and proceeds to recommend
death sentence). Ifthejury does not unanimously recommend the death sentence, the defendant
will receive life imprisonment. Id. § 19.2-264.4. If thejury does unanimously recommend the
death sentence, the court must consider a postsentence report from the probation office that
advises the court whether the death sentence is appropriate and just in the particular case. Id.
§ 19.2-264.5. The postsentence report must contain a victim impact statement. Id. After
considering the report, the court may, upon a showing of good cause, set aside the jury's sen-
tence of death and impose life imprisonment. Id.
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
After a jury recommends a death sentence, the trial judge decides
whether the defendant should actually receive the sentence.2 2 In making this
decision, the judge must consider a written victim impact statement that
details the effects of the murder.2" Upon a showing of good cause, the judge
may reject the jury's recommendation of a death sentence and impose a
sentence of life imprisonment.2' If the defendant does not show good cause
and if the judge determines that the jury's recommendation of capital punish-
ment is appropriate, the court then imposes a sentence of death.20 5
2. Victim Impact Evidence and the Virginia Supreme Court
As a matter of first impression, the Virginia Supreme Court in Weeks v.
Commonwealth" addressed sentencing phase testimony regardingthe impact
of a murder on the victim's survivors.27 Although the Virginia Supreme
Court did not discuss the issue, the trial court presumably admitted the victim
impact testimony pursuant to the statutory provision that allows the admission
of evidence relating to any matter the court deems relevant to the sentence.2 8
With virtually no discussion, the Weeks court held as a general proposition
202. See id. § 19.2-264.5 (directing court to have probation officer investigate relevant
facts and history of defendant to determine if death sentence is "appropriate andjust"). "[U]pon
good cause shown," the judge may disregard the jury's recommendation of the death penalty
and impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Id
203. See id. (requiring judge to consider victim impact statement before imposing sen-
tence). Section 19.2-264.5 mandates the contents of the victim impact statement by reference
to § 19.2-299.1, which does not apply to capital punishment cases. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
299.1 (Michie Supp. 1998).
204. See id. § 19.2-264.5 (noting thatjudge may, upon good cause shown, set aside jury's
recommendation of death sentence and impose term of life imprisonment).
205. See id (noting thatjudge may, upon good cause shown, set asidejury's recommenda-
tion of death sentence and impose term of life imprisonment).
206. 450 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1994).
207. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90 (Va. 1994) (addressing defen-
dant's argument that victim impact evidence was not relevant to capital sentencing in Virginia).
In Weeks, ajury convicted the petitioner of capital murder for the killing of a law enforcement
officer who was performing an official duty. Id. at 382. At sentencing, the trial court admitted
testimony from the victim's widow and the victim's coworkers regarding the effect of the
murder on the victim's family and coworkers. Id at 389. The jury recommended a sentence
of death based on Virginia's "vileness" aggravator. Id at 382. On appeal, petitioner argued that
victim impact evidence was not relevant to the jury's sentencing decision. Id at 389. As an
example of relevance, the court stated that victim impact testimony was probative of the
"depravity of mind" element of the vileness aggravator, on which the jury had based its sen-
tence. Id. at 390. Citing Payne v. Tennessee, the court held as a general proposition that victim
impact testimony was relevant to sentencing capital murder prosecutions. Id at 389.
208. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1996) (governing capital sentencing
proceedings) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie Supp. 1998)).
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that victim impact evidence is relevant to capital sentencing in Virginia.2 9 As
the rationale for this holding, the court merely cited Payne and quoted the
United States Supreme Court's statement that individual states are permitted
to conclude that victim impact evidence is relevant to capital sentencing.210
The Weeks court also offered one possibility for its attribution of probative
value to victim impact evidence - the evidence has a tendency to show de-
pravity of mind, a component of the vileness aggravator.2 ' Similar to the
court's holding, however, this example was merely a conclusory statement
followed by a quotation from Payne.212
In the 1997 case of Beck v. Commonwealth,"3 the Virginia Supreme
Court simultaneously extended and limited the holding of Weeks." 4 Beck
209. See Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 389 (holding victim impact evidence relevant at capital
sentencing in Virginia). The full extent of the court's discussion of this holding is as follows:
[W]e hold that victim impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital
murder prosecution in Virginia, and that the trial court did not err in admitting the
testimony in this case. In [Payne], the Supreme Court authorized the use of such
testimony. TheCourtsaid: "A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about
the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to
the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
210. See id. ("A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about
the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether
or not the death penalty should be imposed." (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827)).
211. See id. at 390 (providing example that victim impact evidence was probative of
depravity of mind component of vileness aggravator).
212. See id. (providing example that victim impact evidence was probative of depravity of
mind component ofvileness aggravator). The full extent of the court's discussion regarding this
example is as follows:
[U]nder Virginia's modem, bifurcated capital procedure, victim impact evidence
is probative, for example, of the depravity of mind component of the vileness
predicate, which the jury in this case found as a basis for imposing the death
penalty. As the Supreme Court said in Payne, "for the jury to assess meaningfully
the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at
the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant."
Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825); see also infra notes 245-57 (discussing depravity of mind
component of vileness aggravator).
213. 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).
214. Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (Va.) (extending Weeks rule to
statements from those who are well-acquainted with victim and limiting admissibility ofvictim
impact evidence to that which is relevant to show impact of defendant's actions), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 608 (1997). In Beck the petitioner pleaded guilty to three capital murders. Id. at
900. The trial court, sitting without ajury at sentencing, had received numerous letters from
friends and coworkers of the victims, as well as from members of the victims' families. Id. at
903. In response to Beck's argument, the court reasoned that the language of Payne contained
neither an express nor an implied requirement that victim impact evidence come only from
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
pleaded guilty to three capital murders and received three death sentences
from the court, which sat without ajury because of the guilty pleas.2 5 Invok-
ing an argument that the Weeks court had refused to consider on procedural
grounds,2 Beck contended that evidence about the murder's effect on the
survivors of the victim could come only from family members, and not from
friends and coworkers.217 The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that Payne does
not limit the scope of relevant victim impact to the effect that the victim's
death had on members ofthe victim's family.2  The court held that relevance
was the only limit on the admission of victim impact evidence.2 9
As in Weeks, the Beck court responded to the defendant's argument with
a holding that, by its terms, applies to all capital sentencings in Virginia."
Its generalizations about victim impact evidence notwithstanding, the Beck
court emphasized that a judge, not a jury, had sentenced Beck." Further-
more, the trial judge had explicitly stated that he would base his sentencing
decision solely on evidence received from individuals of sufficiently close
relation to the victim.' The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Beck's death
sentences without even attempting to determine the specific victim impact
evidence upon which the trial court had actually relied.' Thus, the admission
family members. Id. The court held that the admissibility of victim impact evidence is limited
only by its relevance in demonstrating "the impact of the defendant's actions." Id. at 904.
215. See id. at 900 (noting that Beck pleaded guilty to three capital murders and received
three death sentences from court, which sat without jury).
216. See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994) (refusing to address
Weeks's claim that court should limit victim impact evidence to effect of murder on family
members because Weeks made no distinctionbetween sources ofvictim impactevidence attrial).
217. See Beck, 484 S.E.2d at 903 (addressing Beck's argument that documents submitted
to court from friends and coworkers of victims were beyond scope of Payne holding).
218. See id (rejecting Beck's contention that Payne limited victim impact evidence to
effect of murder on family members).
219. See id. at 904 (holding that relevance to impact of defendant's actions was sole limita-
tion on admission of victim impact evidence). Citing Payne, however, the court did note that
a constitutional problem could arise if the prejudice resulting from victim impact evidence
becomes too great: "So long as its prejudicial effect does not outweigh its probative value,
[victim impact] evidence is beneficial to the determination of an individualized sentence as is
required by the Eighth Amendment." Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,825 (1991)).
220. See id. ("We hold that the admissibility of victim impact evidence during the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital murder trial is limited only by the relevance of such evidence to show the
impact of the defendant's actions.").
221. See id. at 905 (emphasizing that Beck received death sentences from judge, not from
jury).
222. See id. (noting trial judge's statement that he would give consideration only to
appropriate victim impact evidence in sentencing Beck on capital murder charges).
223. See id. at 906 (refusing to find abuse of discretion on part of trial judge without
attempting to determine extent to which trial judge relied upon victim impact evidence).
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ofnonfamily victim impact evidence in sentencings before ajury may present
a closer question outside of the bench trial context.' 4
To some extent, Beck extends the potential sources of victim impact
evidence.' However, the language ofthe Beckholding tempers the uncondi-
tional relevance that the Weeks court had afforded to such evidence. 6 Addi-
tionally, Beck suggests that Virginia applies a more stringent standard for
admitting victim impact evidence than contemplated by the United States
Supreme Court in Payne." 7 Purporting to follow Payne, the Beck court
defined the outer limit of admissibility as the point at which the prejudice
resulting from victim impact evidence outweighs the probative value of the
evidence." However, the Payne Court looked only to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause as the proper remedy in cases in which the preju-
dice resulting from the introduction of victim impact evidence rendered the
trial fundamentally unfair? 9 Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court's threshold
for excluding victim impact evidence is the point at which the prejudicial
effect eclipsesthe probative value; in contrast, the correspondingPayne thresh-
old is the point at which the victim impact evidence renders the trial funda-
mentally unfair? 0
Weeks andBeckclearly indicate that the Virginia Supreme Court deemed
victim impact evidence relevant to capital sentencing even before the 1998
statutory amendment mandated the admission of victim impact evidence."
224. SeeMaryK. Martin, CaseNote, Beckv. Commonwealth, 10 CAP.DEF.J. 27,30(1997)
(noting possibility that Beck's broad relevance standard may not apply to jury sentencings).
225. See Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 903 (Va.) (stating that Payne does not
limit source of victim impact evidence to family members), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 608 (1997).
226. Compare id. at 904 ("We hold that the admissibility of victim impact evidence during
the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial is limited only by the relevance of such evidence
to show the impact of the defendant's actions.") with Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379,
389 (Va. 1994) ("[W]e hold that victim impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital
murder prosecution in Virginia....").
227. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between lan-
guage in Payne and Beck).
228. SeeBeck, 484 S.E.2d at 904 (stating thatEighth Amendment requires probativevalue
ofvictim impact evidence to outweigh its prejudicial effect (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 825 (1991))).
229. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (noting that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides relief when admission of victim impact evidence results in fundamentally unfair
trial).
230. Compare Beck 484 S.E.2d at 904 ("So long as its prejudicial effect does not outweigh
its probative value, [victim impact evidence] is beneficial to the determination of an individual-
ized sentence as is required by the Eighth Amendment.") with Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 ("In the
eventthat evidence is introducedthatis so unduly prejudicialthat itrendersthetrial fundamentally
unfair, theDueProcess Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendmentprovides amechanism forrelief.").
231. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie Supp. 1998) (mandating admission of
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
However, the full extent to which the court would have allowed victim impact
evidence is far less clear because Weeks and Beck failed to discuss fully the
limitations, if any, on the admission of such evidence.3 2 The 1998 statutory
amendment, however, effectively renders this uncertainty moot because of the
amendment's broad language. 3 Notwithstanding the statutory provision and
the judicial decisions regarding victim impact evidence, victim impact evi-
dence is irrelevant to the capital sentencing decision in Virginia and should
not be admissible.?
3. Victim Impact Evidence Is Not Relevant
The future dangerousness aggravator requires the government to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would be likely to commit
additional violent acts and thereby present a threat to society.25 When
considering this aggravator, the sentencing body may evaluate both the defen-
dant's prior history and the particular circumstances of the murder at issue. 6
Evidence ofa defendant's prior violent conduct demonstrates a disposition for
violence, and, according to the Virginia Supreme Court, such a disposition
clearly increases the probability that a defendant would engage in acts of
violence at some point in the future? 7 Likewise, the circumstances of the
murder may indicate that a defendant simply does not value human life and
thus would likely kill others in the future.?
victim impact evidence at capital sentencing).
232. See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994) (holding that victim
impact testimony was relevant to capital murder prosecution); see alsoBeck v. Commonwealth,
484 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (Va.) (extending Weeks holding to include victim impact testimony
from individuals beyond victim's family), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 608 (1997).
233. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.4 (mandating admission of victim impact evidence
at capital sentencing). Section 19.2-264.4 states that "[t]he court shall limit the victim's
testimony to the factors set forth in clauses (i) through (vi) of subsection A of § 19.2-299.1."
Id. However, these factors -which include "any ... psychological injury," "any change in...
personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships," and "such other information as the court
may require" - are so broad as to constitute virtually no limit whatsoever. See id. § 19.2-299.1.
234. See infra Part IV.C.3 (arguing that victim impact evidence is irrelevant to capital
sentencing in Virginia).
235. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (requiring government to prove that defendant
would "commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society" for future dangerousness aggravator).
236. See id. (predicating future dangerousness finding on consideration of defendant's
prior criminal record or circumstances of murder at issue).
237. See Bassett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 844, 849 (Va. 1981) (finding that defen-
dant's prior violent criminal conduct demonstrates propensity for violence).
238. See Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 131 (Va. 1996) (upholding finding of
future dangerousness because murder of two adults and three children indicated that defendant
placed no value on human life).
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These types of evidence, valued for their predictive qualities, stand in
contrast to victim impact evidence. 9 The Virginia Supreme Court chose to
permit the admission of victim impact evidence not to portray the probability
of any future acts of the defendant, but rather to demonstrate the individual's
culpability for a past act - the particular murder at issue.24 Because the
acknowledged purpose of victim impact evidence is to demonstrate an aspect
of the defendant's moral guilt, and not to demonstrate the defendant's propen-
sity for violence, victim impact evidence is not relevant to the future danger-
ousness aggravator.24' Consequently, attention must turn to the remaining
aggravator - vileness.242
The vileness aggravator applies when a defendant's conduct in commit-
ting murder was outrageously vile, horrible, or inhuman.243 By statute, the
vileness aggravator consists of three possible components -torture, depravity
of mind, and aggravated battery.2' To reach an affirmative decision on
vileness, the jury need find only one of the three components.245 Both aggra-
vated battery, which means a battery involving more force or effort than is
minimally necessary to effect a murder, and torture clearly relate to the
physical conduct of the defendant in relation to the victim. 246 Thus, a finding
239. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie Supp. 1998) (predicating finding of future
dangerousness on consideration ofdefendant's prior criminal record or circumstances of murder
at issue).
240. See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390 (Va. 1994) (stating that victim
impact evidence is relevant to "specific harm" that defendant caused (quoting Payne v. Tennes-
see, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991))).
241. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (requiring government to prove that defendant
would "commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society" for future dangerousness aggravator).
242. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995) (providing that defendant cannot
receive death sentence unless court or jury finds either future dangerousness or vileness of
offense and proceeds to recommend death sentence).
243. See id. (establishing aggravator for conduct that is "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman").
244. See id. (establishing aggravator for conduct that was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the
victim").
245. See id. (describing vileness as involving "torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery to the victim" (emphasis added)); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 422 S.E.2d 380, 395 (Va.
1992) (stating that proof of any one of three vileness components is sufficient for finding of
vileness).
246. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978) (construing "aggra-
vated battery" to mean "battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than
the minimum necessary to accomplish an act ofimurder"). Because the Virginia Supreme Court
has not explicitly construed "torture" as used in the Virginia Code, this component of vileness
would seem to carry its generally accepted meaning into the statute. See WEBSTER'S THIRD
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of vileness predicated on either torture or aggravated battery depends upon the
specific physical acts that the defendant committed in the course of the
murder.247
Conversely, victim impact evidence relates not to the nature of the direct
physical act that was the murder, but to the necessarily indirect impact that a
person's death has upon survivors.248 The "impact" of a murder, meaning the
effect of the victim's death on survivors, is conceptually one step removed
from the defendant's actual act of murdering the victim. This degree of sep-
aration strips victim impact evidence of any potential relevance to the vileness
aggravator's components of aggravated battery and torture, both of which
concern only the direct actions of the defendant in relation to the victim.249
As a result, the depravity of mind component of the vileness aggravator
remains as the sole possible justification for the admission of victim impact
evidenceY
In the context of capital sentencing, the Virginia Supreme Court has
interpreted the term depravity of mind to mean an unusually high degree of
moral turpitude and "psychical debasement.""1 Although a defendant's
actions often support the sentencing body's finding of depravity, such actions
are merely evidence of the substantive mental condition that the term de-
scribes.' 2 The scope of the depravity component therefore extends beyond
NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 2414 (3d ed. 1993) (defining torture, alternatively, as "the
infliction of intense pain.., to give sadistic pleasure to the torturer" and "anguish of body or
mind"). The conclusion that"torture" in Code ofVirginiaAnnotated § 19.2-264.2 contemplates
only physical acts, and not nonphysical acts tending to induce anguish of mind, finds support
in Poyner v. Commonwealth, in which the Virginia Supreme Court held that psychological
torture "falls squarely within" Smith's definition ofthe depravity ofmindcomponent ofvileness.
Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 832 (Va. 1985).
247. See Smith, 248 S.E.2dat 149 (construing "aggravated battery" to mean "battery which,
qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish
an act of murder").
248. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (noting that victim impact
evidence demonstrates the "specific harm caused by the crime" (emphasis added)).
249. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing physical character of aggra-
vated battery and torture components of vileness predicate).
250. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995) (describing components of vileness
predicate as "torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
251. See Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149 (explaining depravity of mind component as "degree of
moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary
legal malice and premeditation").
252. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131, 139 (Va. 1995) (noting
that murdering two individuals in their home, stripping their dead bodies ofjewelry, and steal-
ing two automobiles and various personal property from victims demonstrated depravity of
mind); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 422 S.E.2d 380, 396 (Va. 1992) (finding that mutilation of
murder victim's breasts demonstrated depravity of mind); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329
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the physical acts that the other two vileness components contemplate.z 3 For
this reason, the position that victim impact evidence relates to depravity of
mind is perhaps more tenable than either of the other components of the vile-
ness aggravator?"
The Weeks court suggestedthatvictim impact evidencemighttendto prove
depravity ofmind. 5 The court, however, provided no reasoning to supportthis
assertion. 6 Nonetheless, the heavy reliance thatthe Weeks courtplaced onthe
language and reasoning of Payne suggests that the derivation of the court's
position lies in the Tennessee statute brought to bear upon Pervis Payne. 7
At Payne's sentencing hearing, the prosecution presented testimony from
a family member of the two murder victims that described the impact that the
murders had on the family. 8 The prosecutor later argued to the jury that this
impact made Payne's offenses "especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious.""
The language of the prosecutor's phrase tracks a Tennessee statutory aggrava-
tor on which the state relied to obtain the death penalty against Payne.
2 0
Regarding this aggravator, the Tennessee Code provides that a murder is
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel if it involves torture or a degree of
physical harm exceeding that which was necessary to cause the death of the
S.E.2d 815, 832 (Va. 1985) (noting that shooting "defenseless" woman in back of head after she
had complied with defendant's demands and begged for her life demonstrated depravity of
mind).
253. See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282-83 (Va. 1983) (noting that
defendant's planning and lack of remorse demonstrated depravity of mind).
254. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (describing components of vileness predicate as
"torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
255. See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390 (Va. 1994) (stating as example
that victim impact evidence had relevance to depravity of mind component of vileness aggrava-
tor).
256. See id. (stating without explanation that victim impact evidence was "probative, for
example, of the depravity of mind component of the vileness predicate").
257. See id. (quoting Payne as rationale to support decision).
258. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,814-15 (1991) (quoting sentencing phase testi-
mony of woman who was mother and grandmother, respectively, of the two individuals whom
Payne murdered).
259. Id. at 816. At the sentencing phase, the prosecutor's rebuttal argument emphasized
the impact of the murders on Nicholas Christopher, the young child who survived the attack that
killed his mother Charisse and sister Lacie. Id. at 815-16. The prosecutor further argued in
rebuttal that Payne's attorney did not want the jury to consider the plight of Nicholas, who
mourned and wanted to know where "his best little playmate" Lacie had gone. Id. at 816. After
noting that Nicholas no longer had "anybody to watch cartoons with him," the prosecutor told
the jury that "[t]hese are the things that go into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atro-
cious." Id
260. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19-20 (Tenn. 1990) (noting that state sought to
prove murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel), aft'd, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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victim.26" ' Thus, the Tennessee aggravator underlying Payne's death sentence
is similar to Virginia's vileness aggravator.262
Against the statutory language of Tennessee's aggravator, the Payne
prosecutor's argument is a non sequitur because the "heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravator contemplates only the physical conduct of the defendant in
relation to the murder victim" 3 Without specifically addressing the connec-
tion between victim impact and the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee found the prosecutor's argument relevant to
Payne's responsibility and "blameworthiness."' The United States Supreme
Court, likewise failing to establish a link between the victim impact argument
and the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator, affirmed the Tennessee
court's decision to allow the argument. 5
Thus, the prosecutorial argument that the Supreme Court approved in
Payne provides the foundation for the Weeks court's sole example of the rele-
vance attributable to victim impact evidence in Virginia.2  The derivation of
the depravity of mind example suggests its conceptual basis.267 A defendant's
decision to commit murder could evince depravity of mind because thatdefen-
danteitherknowsorshouldknowthatthevictim inevitably has survivors whom
the murder will adversely affect.26 Even defendants who lack such specific
261. SeeTENN.CODEANN. § 39-13-204(iX5)(Supp. 1998) (statingthatheinous, atrocious,
or cruel aggravator refers to murders involving "torture or serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death").
262. Compare ict (establishing aggravator that "murder was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce
death") with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995) (establishing aggravator that defen-
dant's conduct in committing murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discilssing Tennessee's heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel aggravator).
264. See Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 19 (finding that prosecutor's victim impact argument was
relevant to Payne's "personal responsibility and moral guilt"). Interestingly, the Tennessee
Supreme Court described the similarly themed victim impact testimony that preceded the
prosecutor's argument as "technically irrelevant." Id. at 18. The court applied harmless error
analysis to this testimony and found no error. Ma As to the prosecutorial argument pertaining
to victim impact, however, the court found the argument acceptable and applied harmless error
analysis to the argument only as an alternative basis for decision. Id at 19.
265. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (rejecting Supreme Court's
previous view that prosecutor may not present argument concerning victim impact).
266. Seesupra note262 and accompanyingtext(comparing language of Tennessee'shein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator with language of Virginia's vileness aggravator).
267. See supra note 262 and accompanying text(comparing language ofTennessee's hein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator with language of Virginia's vileness aggravator).
268. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing connection between
victim impact and defendant's blameworthiness). In his concurring opinion in Payne, Justice
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knowledge or actual foresight may nonetheless incur a measure of moral guilt
because of a particular murder's impact on survivors of the victim.
2 69
Assuming arguendo that defendants incur moral guilt because of their
specific knowledge or actual foresight regarding the effect of the murder on
the victim's survivors, the conclusion that victim impact evidence is relevant
to depravity of mind does not follow. ° The Virginia Supreme Court's
extensive reliance on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Payne
suggests that the two courts share the same view on victim impact evidence.27
The Payne Court's justification for the admission of victim impact evidence,
however, was the tendency of that type of evidence to demonstrate both the
specific harm that the defendant caused and the moral guilt that purportedly
attached to the defendant as a result.272 Although the Supreme Court unequiv-
ocally decided that this specific harm was relevant to a determination of the
appropriate punishment, Payne does not suggest that the impact of a murder
is relevant to any character trait or attribute of the defendant personally.273
Conversely, the depravity of mind component of Virginia's vileness aggrava-
tor conditions the appropriate punishment upon a personal attribute of the
defendant.274 Because of this distinction, victim impact evidence is not
probative of depravity of mind and thus is not relevant to capital sentencing
in Virginia.275
Souter argued:
Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal re-
sponsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique
person, like himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associates,
"survivors," who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death.
Id. (emphasis added).
269. See id. at 837-38 (Souter, J., concurring) ("While adefendant's anticipation of specif-
ic consequences to the victims of his intended act is relevant to sentencing, such detailed
foreknowledge does not exhaust the category of morally relevant fact.").
270. See infra notes 271-75 and accompanying text (arguing that victim impact evidence
is not relevant to depravity of mind component of vileness aggravator).
271. See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90 (Va. 1994) (quoting Payne
as rationale to support decision).
272. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) ("We are now of the view that a
State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral
culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of
the specific harm caused by the defendant.").
273. See id. (noting that victim impact evidence demonstrates specific harm that actual
crime caused).
274. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978) (construing depravity
of mind component as "degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that
inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation").
275. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (stating that victim impact evidence demonstrates harm
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The lack of relevance attributable to victim impact evidence at capital
sentencing in Virginia necessarily leads to the conclusion that the 1998 statu-
tory amendment that requires courts to permit victim impact evidence at
capital sentencing hearings276 is seriously misguided. By removing all discre-
tion from trial courts and mandating admission of victim impact evidence
upon a motion by the prosecution, 277 the amendment makes no allowance for
cases in which victim impact evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it clearly
should not be admitted.278 Thus, the amendment will result in the introduction
of evidence that offers nothing more than the likelihood of unfair prejudice to
defendants who are facing the possibility of death at the hands of the govern-
ment. In light of the substantive Virginia law governing capital murder, and
given the nature of victim impact evidence, trial courts in capital murder cases
should not admit victim impact evidence.
V. Due Process and Victim Impact Evidence
The United States Supreme Court in Payne stated that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could limit the admission of victim
impact evidence at capital sentencing.279 Although this proposition consists
of only a single sentence in the majority's opinion, the Court made clear
that admission of victim impact evidence violates due process if the
unduly prejudicial effect of such evidence results in fundamental unfair-
ness to the defendant.210 Accordingly, it is worthwhile to consider the due
process standards that govern victim impact evidence at capital sentencing
hearings.281
that actual crime caused); Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149 (construing depravity of mind component
as descriptive of defendant's "psychical debasement").
276. See VA. CoDEANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie Supp. 1998) ("In any [capital sentencing]
proceeding.... the court shall permit the victim... to testify in the presence of the accused
regarding the impact of the offense upon the victim.").
277. See id. ("In any [capital sentencing] proceeding. . . , the court shall permit the
victim..., upon the motion ofthe attorney for the Commonwealth, and with the consent of the
victim, to testify in the presence of the accused regarding the impact of the offense upon the
victim.").
278. Cf Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,825 (1991) (acknowledging thatvictim impact
evidence may be so unduly prejudicial as to render trial fundamentally unfair).
279. See id. (noting due process restriction on victim impact evidence).
280. See id. ("In the event that [victim impact] evidence is introduced that is so unduly
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.").
281. See infra notes 283-307 and accompanying text (discussing due process standards).
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 295 (1999)
Without discussion, the Payne Court offered only one case, Darden v.
Wainwright,"2 to define the specific contours of the protection that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides against victim impact
evidence.283 In Darden, the Supreme Court addressed prosecutorial miscon-
duct at the guilt phase of a capital murder trial.2 In addressing Darden's
argument that his trial and resulting conviction were fundamentally unfair
because of the prosecution's improper argument,"5 the Court characterized the
inquiry as whether the improper comments were so unfair as to make the
conviction a denial of due process. 286 Because this circular standard offers
little in the way of specific guidance, it is necessary to consider Darden in
conjunction with related Supreme Court decisions.2 7
282. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
283. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83
(1986)); Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-83 ("The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' com-
ments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process."' (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974))). In Darden, the
petitioner had received a sentence of death in a Florida court for murder. Id at 170. Darden
unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Id. at 171. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and addressed Darden's claim that the prosecution's closing argument
at the guilt phase of the trial made the conviction fundamentally unfair. Id. at 178-79. Empha-
sizing the importance of the context in which the prosecution made the argument, the Court
noted several features of the argument that Darden's counsel made prior to the prosecution's
argument. Id. at 179. The Court stated that the prosecution's "argument deserves the condem-
nation it has received from every court to review it." Id Impropriety notwithstanding, the
Court characterized the issue as a question of whether the argument "so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Id. at 181 (quoting
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643). Applying this standard, the Court found that the prosecution's
argument did not deprive Darden of his right to a fair trial. Id The argument did not "manipu-
late or misstate the evidence" and it did not implicate any of Darden's specific constitutional
rights. Id. at 181-82. The Court observed that some of the prosecution's improper comments
came in response to improper defense argument. Id at 182. Finally, the Court stated that the
weight of the evidence against Darden was sufficiently heavy to negate any possibility that the
prosecution's inflammatory remarks influenced the jury. Id.
284. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 178 (addressing Darden's contention that prosecution's
closing argument at guilt-innocence phase resulted in fundamentally unfair conviction).
285. In his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the defendant as follows: "He
shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end of
that leash.... I wish that I could see him sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun."
Id. at 180 n.12.
286. See id. at 181 (stating that standard for reviewing petitioner's claim of fundamental
unfairness was "whether the prosecutors' comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process"' (quoting DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at
643)).
287. See id. (stating that standard for reviewing petitioner's claim of fundamental unfair-
ness was "whether the prosecutors' comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process"' (quoting DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643)).
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The Darden Court based its due process standard on Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo,s8 another prosecutorial misconduct case." 9 In considering
DeChristoforo's claim that his first degree murder conviction violated his due
process rights, the Court statedthatthe due process analysis properly addresses
more thanjust the questionable prosecutorial conduct itself.2 ' Instead, a court
making a due process inquiry must consider the challenged conduct in relation
to the proceeding as a whole.29' The analysis of a due process claim founded
onunfairprosecutorial conductmaythus dependuponnumerous factors, which
include the severity of the prosecutorial misconduct,2' the relative dimension
of the improper conduct,293 the issuance of curative instructions from the
court,294 any defense conduct inviting improper prosecutorial response,295 and
288. 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
289. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (addressing respondent's
claim that prosecutor's argument made conviction so unfair as to deny due process). In
DeChristoforo, a Massachusetts jury convicted DeChristoforo of first degree murder and the
court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Id. at 638. DeChristoforo unsuccessfully sought
habeas corpus relief in federal court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the prosecutor's improper remark resulted in a denial of due process. Id. at 638-39.
The Court considered the prosecutor's remark in the context of the entire proceeding against
DeChristoforo. Id at 643. Reasoning that the improper remark was but a brief portion of the
prosecutor's argument, that the comment was ambiguous, and that the trial court instructed the
jury to disregard the comment, the Court found that the prosecutor's conduct did not amount
to a denial of due process. Id at 645.
Although a first degree murder case, DeChristoforo involved the imposition of life impris-
onment for a death-eligible conviction. Id. at 638. Nonetheless, the due process framework that
the Court established in DeChristoforo is applicable to direct review of capital sentencing
proceedings. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) (noting that DeChristoforo
provided "proper analytical framework" for due process claim regarding admission of specified
evidence at capital sentencing hearing).
290. See DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 639 (stating that Court granted certiorari to consider
improper prosecutorial remarks "in the context of the entire trial").
291. See id (stating that Court granted certiorari to consider improper prosecutorial
remarks "in the context of the entire trial"); id at 643 (finding that "examination of the entire
proceedings in this case" did not support claim of due process violation).
292. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986) (stating that comments,
though objectionable, neither manipulated nor misstated evidence); DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.
at 647-48 (noting distinction between "ordinary trial error of a prosecutor" and "egregious mis-
conduct" in due process analysis).
293. See DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 645 (emphasizing that questionable remark was brief
portion of long trial).
294. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 (noting that trial court repeatedly issued cautionary
instructions to jury regarding distinction between evidence and argument); DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. at 645 (noting that court issued corrective instruction regarding questionable remark by
prosecutor).
295. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 (stating that improper prosecutorial comments were
responsive to questionable defense argument).
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the weight of the evidence.296
Because Darden and DeChristoforo both involved due process claims
founded on prosecutorial misconduct, their due process framework undoubt-
edly applies to cases in which the prosecution's argument at the sentencing
phase invokes a murder's impact on the victim's family.2 97 Likewise, the
Payne Court's invocation of Darden indicates that the same due process
analysis applies to the introduction of victim impact evidence.298 Thus, the
Payne Court perceived the limitation on the admission of victim impact
evidence at capital sentencing to be the basic due process concept of funda-
mental fairness.299
Although the idea of fundamental fairness is central to constitutional law,
this aspect of due process does not readily submit to definition.3" The due
process inquiry in any particular case largely depends on the specific circum-
stances surrounding that case.'O It is not enough for courts to consider merely
the nature and the extent of the victim impact evidence alone.0 2 Rather,
courts making the fundamental fairness inquiry must scrutinize the challenged
victim impact evidence in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding.0 3
This holistic approach indicates that the factors discussed in Darden and
DeChristoforo, as well as any pertinent additional circumstances, comprise
the necessary elements of a due process analysis in a particular case." For
296. See id. (noting that heavy weight of evidence against petitioner reduced influence of
improper prosecutorial argument).
297. See id. at 178-83 (addressing claimthatprosecutorial argumentviolateddueprocess);
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-45 (1974) (same).
298. See Paynev. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (citingDarden forproposition that
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides relief from unduly prejudicial victim
impact evidence); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) (noting that De-
Christoforo standard, which Darden Court incorporated, applied to direct review of due process
claim regarding admission of evidence at sentencing).
299. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (notingthatFourteenth Amendment's DueProcess Clause
provides relief when introduction of victim impact evidence makes trial "fundamentally unfair").
300. See Lassiterv. Department ofSoc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24(1981) (stating that funda-
mental fairness is "a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty").
301. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (noting relevant factors in addressing
claim of fundamental unfairness).
302. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (explaining that due process inquiry must
address challenged remark in context of entire proceeding).
303. See Romano, 512 U.S. at 12 (stating that relevant inquiry for determining whether
introduction of specified evidence at capital sentencing violated due process was whether
evidence "so infected the sentencingproceeding with unfairness as to render thejury's imposi-
tion of the death penalty a denial of due process" (emphasis added)).
304. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (providing relevant factors in addres-
sing claim of fundamental unfairness).
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example, in some cases the jury may already know certain facts about the
individual murder victim from evidence adduced at the guilt phase of the
trial." 5 Under these circumstances, the sentencing jury's familiarity with the
facts about the victim may significantly diminish the due process threat
presented by victim impact evidence on the same general topic.3" In all cases,
however, the due process analysis is a highly fact-sensitive process that
scrutinizes the particularized circumstances involved.3 7
VI Conclusion
Since the Payne Court removed the outright constitutional bar in 1991,
victim impact evidence has become a prevalent and significant feature at
capital sentencing hearings.0 8 Legislatures and courts in both the federal and
the state systems have exhibited strong support for allowing murder victims
and their survivors to have a role in the sentencing process.309 Political power
notwithstanding, the victims' rights movement should not compel legislative
or judicial decisions that effectively nullify a jurisdiction's fundamental
requirements for the admission of evidence.' 10 By admitting victim impact
evidence, courts disregard both laws and established procedures.3 ' As a
result, sentencing bodies become prejudiced against defendants, and this
prejudice violates a right- the right to due process of law -that the Constitu-
tion guarantees to all criminal defendants.'
Should a convicted murderer die for taking the life of another? This
essential question underlies every capital sentencing hearing. Subject to
numerous constitutional mandates announced by the United States Supreme
305. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (noting that sentencing jury may
have already heard evidence relating to victim from guilt phase of trial).
306. See id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that victim impact testimony at
sentencing does not constitute due process violation when it merely amplifies certain facts that
jury already knows from guilt-innocence phase).
307. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (providing relevant factors in addres-
sing claim of fundamental unfairness).
308. See Koskela, supra note 1, at 167 (noting prevalence of state constitutional victim's
rights amendments regarding presentation of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing).
309. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing measures that individual
states have taken to allow victim impact evidence at capital sentencing proceedings).
310. See supra Part IV (discussing victim impact evidence and statutory structures of
federal, Texas, and Virginia law).
311. See supra Part IV (arguing that admission of victim impact evidence contradicts
sentencing provisions of federal, Texas, and Virginia law).
312. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (noting that Due Process Clause
of Fourteenth Amendment may provide relief to defendants if victim impact evidence is so
prejudicial as to encroach upon fundamental fairness of trial).
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Court, each death penalty jurisdiction has enacted specific provisions for
making this determination.313 However, the impact of the victims' rights
movement has obscured not only these specific provisions, but also the basic
proposition that the appropriate punishment for murder depends upon the
particular offense and the particular offender.314 Victim impact evidence
demonstrates neither of these factors and serves only to provoke an emotional
response, untempered by reason. 15 Accordingly, legislatures and courts
should reevaluate the decisions that have allowed victim impact evidence to
become a common feature at capital sentencing hearings.
313. See supra Part IV (arguing that admission of victim impact evidence is contrary to
statutory provisions of federal, Texas, and Virginia law).
314. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Until today our capital punish-
ment jurisprudence has required that any decision to impose the death penalty be based solely
on evidence that tends to inform the jury about the character of the offense and the character of
the defendant."). ObservingthatthePayne decision was an unsupported rejection oflongstand-
ing capital sentencing jurisprudence, Justice Stevens stated: "Today... the Court abandons
rules of relevance that are older than the Nation itself and ventures into uncharted seas of
irrelevance." Id. at 858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
315. See id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that victim impact evidence "serves no
purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of death rather than life on the basis
of their emotions rather than their reason").
